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Preaching to the Court House and Judging in the 
Temple 
Nathan B. Oman 
On the evening of September 9, 1831, two men arrived in the 
small county seat of Jacksonville, Illinois. It was court day, and 
“there were a great many country people in the village.”1 Some no 
doubt had come to settle disputes before the state’s travelling 
judiciary. Illinois law required that all members of the state supreme 
court hold a circuit court in each county seat at least twice a year.2 In 
their wake came the lawyers who “rode circuit” with the judges, 
picking up clients at the local tavern3 and hurriedly conferring with 
them before rising to make their arguments about this man’s failure 
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 1. The Manuscripts of William E. McLellin (1831–36), Journal I, July 18, 1831–
November 20, 1831, 29–60, in THE JOURNALS OF WILLIAM E. MCLELLIN, 1831–1836 at 39 
(Jan Shipps & John W. Welch eds., 1994). Cf. CARL R. LOUNSBURY, THE COURTHOUSES OF 
EARLY VIRGINIA: AN ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY 3 (2005) (“Court day in early Virginia 
transformed many small crossroad villages into bustling rural forums. For one, two, or three 
days of each month, hundreds of inhabitants set out from their farms . . . [to] the center of the 
county at a clearing commonly called the courthouse grounds.”). 
 2. See 1 FREDERIC B. CROSSLEY, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF ILLINOIS 162–68 (1916) 
(discussing the convoluted, on-again-off-again history of circuit courts in Illinois prior to 
1830). 
 3. HENRY C. WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN 41 (Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd. 2000) (1892) (“[O]ur offices were ambulatory, being located now on the 
sunny side of a Court House, then under the shade of a friendly tree, and, anon, on the edge 
of a sidewalk.”). 
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to pay on a note or the damage done by that man’s wandering cow.4 
Others came to watch the spectacle of the court. This September 
evening, however, afforded the citizens of Morgan County a 
different kind of performance. The first of the two men was a school 
teacher turned preacher named William McLellin; his companion 
was Hyrum Smith, brother of the Mormon prophet Joseph Smith 
Jr.5 McLellin recorded: 
[A]s soon as they found out who we were, they gathered around 
us; we separated and talked with them about two hours. I cut some 
of them so close with the truth that a ruffian fellow rolled up his 
sleeves and swore that he could give it to me but a gentleman 
prevented him and took him away.6 
The two Mormon elders made an appointment to “preach next 
day in the Court house.”7 At the designated time, a “numerous 
concourse of people” gathered, and McLellin recorded his 
trepidation at having “to ascend the judges bench, and face Judges, 
Lawyers Doctors Priests and people,” but he added, “I arose with 
confidence in Elijah’s God and gave them a brief history of the book 
of Mormon.”8  
Five years later, a larger group of Mormon elders gathered in 
Kirtland, Ohio, then headquarters of the Mormon Church. They 
made their way to the recently completed Kirtland Temple, which sat 
on a bluff overlooking the Chagrin River flowing toward Lake Erie a 
few miles to the north. The building differed markedly in its 
religious significance from the New England churches that it 
architecturally resembled. Anxious to avoid anything that smacked of 
“Popery,” the Puritans had insisted that their meeting houses were 
just that: places to meet without any special sanctification.9 The 
 
 4. See John A. Lupton, A. Lincoln, Esquire: The Evolution of a Lawyer, in A. LINCOLN, 
ESQUIRE: A SHREWD, SOPHISTICATED LAWYER IN HIS TIME 18, 21 (Allen D. Spiegel ed., 
2002) (“Antebellum Illinois was a litigious society. . . . Legal issues included assault and 
battery, bankruptcy, contract disputes, debt, divorce, medical malpractice, mortgage 
foreclosure, personal injury, slander, and trespass.”). 
 5. See John W. Welch, The Acts of the Apostle William McLellin, in MCLELLIN, supra 
note 1, at 13–26 (giving biographical information on McLellin and his companion).  
 6. The Manuscripts of William E. McLellin, in MCLELLIN supra note 1, at 39. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See James P. Walsh, Holy Time and Sacred Space in Puritan New England, 32 AM. 
Q. 79 (1980) (discussing Puritan attitudes toward their meetings houses). See also Kevin M. 
Sweeny, Meetinghouses, Town Houses, and Churches: Changing Perceptions of Sacred and Secular 
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Mormon edifice, in contrast, had been dedicated in an elaborate set 
of ceremonies that identified it with Old Testament temples, their 
priestly ceremonies, and inner sanctuaries.10 In the dedicatory prayer, 
Joseph Smith implored God that the temple “may be sanctified and 
consecrated to be holy, and that thy holy presence may be 
continually in this house; and that all people who shall enter upon 
the threshold of the Lord’s house may feel thy power and feel 
constrained to acknowledge that thou hast sanctified it, and that it is 
thy house, a place of thy holiness.”11 Hence the Mormon elders who 
made their way to the temple on March 29, 1837 were not simply 
“going to meeting.” Rather, they were entering the sanctified center 
of their religious community.12 Yet despite the geographic and 
symbolic distance between them and the judges, lawyers, and village 
rowdies of Morgan County, the Kirtland elders were also essentially a 
judicial gathering. After opening with prayer, they turned to the case 
of Cahoon v. Green. Elder Cahoon charged Elder Green “1st for 
Disturbing the Sining Scoll several times 2nd for Swearing and 
calling the Complainant a liar. . . .”13 Green denied the charge of 
disturbing the peace, but admitted to the swearing and slander. After 
considering and rejecting Green’s defense that Cahoon was, in fact, a 
liar, the assembled elders voted to withdraw their fellowship from 
him.14 
The juxtaposition of Mormon elders preaching in the court 
house and adjudicating in the temple illustrates the fluidity of the 
boundaries between law and religion in nineteenth-century America. 
 
Space in Southern New England, 1720–1850, 28 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 59 (1993) 
(discussing the shift in attitudes towards churches in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).  
 10. See generally Taylor Petrey, Christian Temple Builders and the Latter-day Saints, in 
ARCHIVE OF RESTORATION CULTURE: SUMMER FELLOWS’ PAPERS 2000–2002, at 139 
(Richard Lyman Bushman ed., 2005). 
 11. THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS § 109:12–13 (1989 ed.) [hereinafter DOCTRINE & COVENANTS]. The Doctrine 
and Covenants consists of written revelations and teachings by Joseph Smith and a handful of 
other Mormon prophets. It has been formally canonized by the Mormon Church and is 
accepted by Mormons as scripture on par with the Bible and the Book of Mormon. It is divided 
into “sections” which are then divided into “verses” in a manner similar to modern Bibles. All 
references are to the section number and verse number. 
 12. Cf. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 
20–68 (1957) (discussing the role and function of sacred space). 
 13. KIRTLAND ELDERS’ QUORUM RECORD 1836–1841, at 25 (Lyndon W. Cook & 
Milton V. Backman, Jr. eds., 1985). 
 14. Id. at 25–26.  
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During the colonial period and the nineteenth century, numerous 
religious groups sought to opt out of the secular legal system, 
moving civil litigation between co-religionists into the hands of the 
church.15 No group was entirely successful in doing so, but some—
particularly the Quakers and the Mormons—were able to forge 
ecclesiastical courts16 that proved remarkably robust over long 
periods of time. Their stories have been told as paeans to alternative 
dispute resolution.17 Believers, so the explanations go, wished to 
avoid the expense of formal litigation and turned to religious fora as 
convenient alternatives to the courts. There is, of course, some truth 
to this view. Yet McLellin’s injection of religion into the civic ritual 
of court day, preaching from the bench to the judges, lawyers, 
litigants, and spectators, and the relocation of adjudication to the 
symbolic heart of their religion by the Kirtland elders problematizes 
any attempt to reduce religious tribunals to simply another player in 
 
 15. See generally JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 19–47 (1983) 
(discussing the resolution of civil disputes in religious fora). 
 16. Not all ecclesiastical tribunals called themselves “courts,” and I use the term 
advisedly, as in some circumstances the border between adjudication and other activities such 
as simple exhortation was porous. Martin Shapiro has argued that the essence of courts as an 
institution lies in a tripartite structure in which there is a dispute between an accuser and 
accused that is decided by some neutral third party. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1984) (“The root concept employed here is a 
simple one of conflict structured in triads. Cutting quite across cultural lines, it appears that 
whenever two persons come into conflict that they cannot themselves solve, one solution 
appealing to common sense is to call upon a third for assistance in achieving a resolution.”). I 
mainly follow Shapiro, although I also refer to essentially inquisitorial institutions as courts 
even though they may lack his tripartite structure. 
 17. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 19–47 (lauding ecclesiastical courts as 
attractive alternatives to the civil court system); George S. Odiorne, Arbitration and Mediation 
Among Early Quakers, 9 ARB. J. 161–66 (1954) (lauding the Quakers’ system of ecclesiastical 
adjudication as an early example of alternative dispute resolution). Cf. WILLIAM M. OFFUTT, 
JR., OF “GOOD LAWS” AND “GOOD MEN”: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE DELAWARE VALLEY, 
1680–1710, at 147 (1995) (referring to “panegyrics composed of anecdotal evidence on 
alternative, community-based dispute resolution systems”). For discussions of the Mormon 
ecclesiastical court system in the nineteenth century, see EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD 
COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830–1900, at 263–370 (1988) (providing a detailed 
summary of the functioning of Mormon ecclesiastical courts from 1846 to 1900); MARK P. 
LEONE, ROOTS OF MODERN MORMONISM 111–48 (1979) (discussing ecclesiastical courts 
among Mormon settlers in nineteenth-century Arizona); C. Paul Dredge, Dispute Settlement in 
the Mormon Community: The Operation of Ecclesiastical Courts in Utah, in 4 ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE: THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: PATTERNS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: 
ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW 191 (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed., 1979) (discussing 
ecclesiastical courts in early Utah); Raymond T. Swenson, Resolution of Civil Disputes by 
Mormon Ecclesiastical Courts, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 573 (1978). 
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the perpetual quest for low-cost dispute resolution. Rather, the move 
to bring litigation within the fold of the church played out against a 
much richer context of civic and religious symbols and institutions, a 
fact powerfully illustrated by the Mormon experience.  
The story of the rise and fall of the jurisdiction of Mormon 
courts over ordinary civil disputes provides us with a number of 
insights into the interaction between law and religion in nineteenth-
century America. It dramatically illustrates the fluidity of the 
boundaries between law and religion early in the century and the 
hardening of those boundaries by its end. The Mormon courts 
initially arose in a context in which the professional bar had yet to 
establish a monopoly over adjudication.18 Rather, churches felt 
confident in their ability to create a “legal” apparatus of judges and 
lawsuits.19 By century’s end, however, the increasing complexity of 
the legal environment pushed the Mormon courts out of the 
business of resolving civil disputes, hardening the boundaries around 
the legal profession’s claimed monopoly over adjudication.20 Equally 
important for the decline of the Mormon courts was the fact that 
allegiance to the common-law courts became a prerequisite of 
assimilation into the American mainstream. While hostility to the 
secular courts had been a hallmark of a major stream of American 
Protestantism during the colonial period and the first decades of the 
Republic, by the end of the nineteenth century, Mormons’ rejection 
of those courts marked them off as dangerous outsiders.21 Part of the 
price of their acceptance into the national mainstream was the 
abandonment of legal distinctiveness. The story of the Mormon 
courts also illustrates the importance of law for the development of 
religious beliefs and practices. Nineteenth-century Mormons 
expended an enormous amount of theological and institutional 
energy on legal issues. Other scholars have documented the “public 
law” side of this story, showing how the federal government’s effort 
to eradicate Mormon polygamy was central to Mormon experience 
in the last half of the nineteenth century and ultimately forced a 
 
 18. See Dredge, supra note 17, at 193–97. See generally, FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra 
note 17, at 25–58 (describing generally the rise of the Mormon court system). 
 19. Dredge, supra note 17, at 193, 198. 
 20. See id. at 198. 
 21. See id. (“Church leaders condemned courts and litigation . . . .”). 
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revolution in Mormon beliefs and practices.22 The rise and fall of the 
Mormon court system, however, shows that private law—subjects 
like contract, tort, and property—could exercise no less of a power 
over the religious imagination. 
Finally, the story told here challenges the standard narrative 
within Mormon history concerning the rise of the church court 
system and the anti-legalism of nineteenth-century Latter-day Saints. 
In their extensive study of civil disputes in Mormon ecclesiastical 
courts, Professors Richard Collin Mangrum and Edwin Firmage 
explain the genesis and rise of Mormon courts entirely in  
terms of the internal imperatives of Mormon theology and 
communitarianism.23 They write, “After they migrated to the deserts 
of the Great Basin, the Saints pursued their radical theory of Zion as 
an alternative to the social experiment of pluralistic America. A 
critical part of this effort was the establishment and maintenance of 
their own court system.”24 This narrative, however, unduly 
emphasizes the uniqueness of the Mormon experience and fails to 
acknowledge the important continuities between the Mormon court 
system and the experience of discipline-oriented Protestant churches. 
Accordingly, this Article emphasizes the way in which the emergence 
of the Mormon court system must be seen within the broader 
context of American and even Atlantic religious history. Only by 
examining the Mormon courts in this broader context can we see the 
way in which they both continued and sharply departed from earlier 
ecclesiastical practices. Mangrum and Firmage, likewise, rightly 
emphasize the anti-lawyer rhetoric of nineteenth-century Mormon 
leaders but fail to appreciate the way in which Mormon attorneys 
resisted their designation as social parasites.25 In contrast, this Article 
shows how Latter-day Saint lawyers crafted their own legitimating 
religious narratives, insisting that “true lawyers” could work 
harmoniously within Mormon norms. In time, church leaders 
 
 22. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002); Elizabeth 
Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon 
Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295 
(1998); Douglas H. Parker, Victory in Defeat—Polygamy and the Mormon Legal Encounter with 
the Federal Government, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 805 (1991). 
 23. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 1–2.  
 24. Id. at 261. 
 25. Id. at 16–18, 271–74. 
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adopted this self-conception of Mormon attorneys in place of their 
earlier blanket denunciations of the legal profession, and it provided 
an important rhetorical bridge between the extensive jurisdiction of 
church courts in the nineteenth century and their abandonment at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part I will 
trace the origins of the Mormon court system, locating it within the 
intellectual and theological context of early America. Part II will 
discuss the effort to move civil litigation between Mormons into the 
ecclesiastical courts. Finally, Part III will discuss the transformation 
of Mormon adjudication, tracing the ultimate abandonment of 
church-based litigation. 
I. THE RISE OF THE MORMON JUDICIARY: 1526–1886 
The Mormon court system emerged from the much older 
tradition of ecclesiastical discipline among the English Protestants 
who settled North America. Under English law, ecclesiastical courts 
were integrated into the judicial machinery of the state. Certain 
kinds of issues—mainly dealing with family law and certain aspects of 
probate—lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Church of England.26 These courts enforced their decisions by 
excommunicating recalcitrant parties, and excommunication would 
then carry certain civil penalties.27 The Church of England, however, 
made comparatively little effort to police the spiritual or moral purity 
of church members.28 The assumption was that attempts to enforce 
ecclesiastical purity through church discipline were unnecessary. 
Indeed those who called for more aggressive church discipline were 
labeled “Donatists” (after an early Christian sect condemned by 
Augustine for their insistence on ecclesiastical purity) and treated as 
 
 26. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 114 (2d ed. 
1979) (“The jurisdiction [of ecclesiastical courts] over marriage, divorce and probate lasted 
until 1857. After 1857 the jurisdiction has been confined to Church matters, such as faculties 
to alter or sell consecrated property and disciplinary proceedings against clergy.”). 
 27. According to William Blackstone: 
[W]ith us by the common law an excommunicated person is disabled to do any act, 
that is required to be done by one that is probus et legalis homo. He cannot serve 
upon juries, cannot be a witness in any court, and, . . . cannot bring an action, either 
real or personal, to recover lands or money due to him. 
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *102. 
 28. See id. 
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dangerous heretics.29 Accordingly, the sanctions of church courts 
were reserved for the ordinary legal cases falling within their 
jurisdiction. Virginia and other colonies where Anglicanism was the 
dominant religion continued this easy-going attitude toward church 
discipline.30 Since they did not have bishops of their own, these 
American churches came under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of 
London. The geographic distance from ecclesiastical courts made it 
all but impossible for them to exercise even ordinary functions, thus 
strengthening the tendency to ignore problems of religious 
impurity.31 Nor does this judicial neglect by the Church of England 
seem to have bothered Virginians very much.32 For example, when 
the Reverend James Blair, founder of The College of William and 
Mary, tried to create local ecclesiastical courts to discipline “all 
cursers Swearers and blasphemers, all whoremongers fornicators and 
Adulterers, all drunkards ranters and profaners of the Lords day,” his 
proposal was treated with horror by the planter elite and quickly 
squashed.33 
The English Protestants who founded the colonies to the north, 
however, rejected the lax attitude of Anglicanism toward church 
discipline.34 The roots of their dissatisfaction lay in a radical wing of 
the German Reformation: the Anabaptists.35 In the sixteenth 
century, the Anabaptists were most notable for their rejection of 
infant baptism and the apocalyptic theocracy of the city of Munster, 
which was bloodily suppressed by the local Catholic bishop in 
 
 29. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, VISIBLE SAINTS: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA 2–4 
(1963). 
 30.  See STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 19–21 (Borzoi Books 
1983). 
 31. See id. at 19 (“[C]olonies south of New England . . . failed to replicate the Anglican 
ecclesiastical system . . . . The Church of England did not help matters along by trying to 
govern colonial religious institutions out of the bishopric of London instead of creating a 
diocese in the New World.”). 
 32. Id. at 19–20. 
 33. See id. at 20. Cf. Joseph C. Robert, Excommunication, Virginia Style, 40 S. 
ATLANTIC Q. 243, 251 (1941) (noting that the discipline of Virginia’s Anglican churches was 
known only for its laxity). 
 34. See Kenneth R. Davis, No Discipline, No Church: An Anabaptist Contribution to the 
Reformed Tradition, 13 THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 43 (1982). 
 35. See generally id. (discussing the Anabaptists’ influence on reforming trends of the 
day). 
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1535.36 The Anabaptists, however, also insisted that discipline was 
the mark of a true church.37 In particular, they focused on the 
eighteenth chapter of Matthew in which Christ commands, “If your 
brother sins against you . . . tell it to the church; and if he refuses to 
listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax 
collector.”38 Adult baptism, insisted one Anabaptist pamphleteer in 
1526, would be “no better than infant baptism had been if fraternal 
admonition and excommunication did not go along with it.”39 In 
Geneva, John Calvin regarded the Anabaptists as one of his chief 
theological rivals, but he nevertheless imbibed their emphasis on 
church discipline from an early teacher with strong Anabaptist 
connections.40 (Calvin also married an Anabaptist widow.41) He 
wrote, “as the saving doctrine of Christ is the soul of the church, so 
does discipline serve as its sinews.”42 He did, however, try to 
distinguish himself from “Donatists and Anabaptists” who “in an 
impious schism separated themselves from Christ’s flock” and 
“under the pretense of their zeal . . . subvert whatever edification 
there is.”43 With the English break from Rome, Calvinist and 
Anabaptist ideas made their way across the Channel. Among the 
Puritan criticisms of the Anglican settlement was their insistence that 
“every church should exclude and expel the wicked.”44 
Like their Anglican cousins to the south, the Puritans of New 
England dispensed with the courts of the Church of England, 
moving matters of traditional ecclesiastical jurisdiction entirely into 
 
 36. See GEORGE HUNTSTON WILLIAMS, THE RADICAL REFORMATION 362–86 (1962) 
(recounting the brief and violent history of the Munster theocracy). Some historians of 
Mormonism have drawn parallels between the radical Anabaptists and the early Mormons. See, 
e.g., D. Michael Quinn, Socio-religious Radicalism of the Mormon Church: A Parallel to the 
Anabaptists, in NEW VIEWS OF MORMON HISTORY: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
LEONARD J. ARRINGTON 363 (Davis Bitton & Maureen Ursenbach Beecher eds., 1987). 
 37. See Davis, supra note 34, at 45. 
 38. Matthew 18:15–17 (RSV). See Davis, supra note 34, at 45. The Anabaptists also 
relied on the parable of the wheat and the tares contained in Matthew 13. They insisted that 
the parable applied only to the world and not the church, which could not include both 
believers and unbelievers. Id. at 44. 
 39. Davis, supra note 34, at 47. 
 40. Id. at 56–57. 
 41. See PATRICK COLLINSON, THE REFORMATION 91 (2003). 
 42. JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1230 (John T. McNeill 
ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westminster John Knox Press 1960) (1559). 
 43. Id. at 1239. 
 44. MORGAN, supra note 29, at 12. 
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the secular courts.45 Their early insistence on the purity of the 
church, however, meant that Puritans kept alive ecclesiastical 
discipline, excommunicating church members who failed to live 
godly lives.46 The practice of formal church discipline among 
Puritans, however, was ultimately limited. Early Puritan theology 
required that church members demonstrate that they had been 
predestined to salvation, an exacting spiritual requirement that few 
congregants met.47 Accordingly, few of the people in Puritan pews 
were actually members of the church and therefore subject to its 
discipline.48 The so-called Halfway Covenant, a form of partial 
church membership, eventually relaxed the prerequisites for church 
membership, increasing the number of congregants potentially 
subject to discipline.49 However, the Halfway Covenant itself seems 
to have dampened the fervor for ecclesiastical purity and with it the 
widespread practice of church trials and excommunication.50 
The same could not be said of the churches that sprouted among 
dissenters from Puritan orthodoxy and other dissenting English 
Protestants. Despite Calvinist antipathy toward Anabaptism, its ideas 
and adherents found their way to New England in the first years of 
settlement. English Separatists in Holland had come into contact 
with Anabaptists in the Low Countries during the 1610s and 1620s, 
and in 1638, Roger Williams established an early Baptist 
 
 45. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STORY OF JOHN 
WINTHROP 95–96 (Oscar Handli ed., 1958) (“Though the ministers enjoyed a powerful 
influence over their congregations, the shadow of Rome still lay heavily on the Puritans. None 
of them wanted a ‘theocracy’ in the sense of government by the clergy. Indeed, of all the 
governments in the Western world at the time, that of early Massachusetts gave the clergy least 
authority.”). The relationship between ecclesiastical and secular courts in Puritan 
Massachusetts was complicated. Although ecclesiastical courts had limited de jure authority, 
secular courts punished offenses such as blasphemy, and on some issues—such as sumptuary 
regulation—secular tribunals only stepped in when the church courts failed to deal with such 
issues “at home.” See generally GEORGE LEE HASKIN, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY 
MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 87–93 (1960).  
 46. See David C. Brown, The Keys of the Kingdom: Excommunication in Colonial 
Massachusetts, 67 NEW ENG. Q. 531, 540–47 (1994). 
 47. See MORGAN, supra note 29, at 64–112 (describing the development of church 
membership among New England Puritans). 
 48. See MORGAN, supra note 29, at 107–09 (discussing the varied reactions of settlers to 
the newly imposed requirements of church membership). 
 49. See generally MORGAN, supra note 29, at 113–38 (discussing the history of the 
Halfway Covenant). 
 50. Indeed, by the end of the seventeenth century, Puritan congregations largely ceased 
to excommunicate their members. See Brown, supra note 46, at 556–57.  
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congregation in Rhode Island that drew on this Separatist 
tradition.51 From these beginnings, American Baptists spread around 
the fringes of New England, and in the 1690s, Baptists from New 
England formed the first Baptist congregation in the southern 
colonies at Charleston, South Carolina.52 While divided in their 
allegiance to Calvinist theology (some Baptists followed the Dutch 
theologian Jacob Arminius, who rejected predestination), Baptists 
retained the early Anabaptist conviction in the need to maintain the 
purity of the church, and prior to the later part of the nineteenth 
century, Baptist congregations aggressively disciplined their 
members. Before 1840, eight percent of white male Baptists may 
have “passed under the church’s rod of discipline” each year.53  
The Quakers provide another instance of a well-developed 
church judiciary emerging from the Radical Reformation. Quakerism 
came out of the radical fringes of British Protestantism during the 
religious and political upheavals that accompanied the English Civil 
War.54 After decades of intermittent persecution in England, the 
Quaker philanthropist William Penn established the colony of 
Pennsylvania as a refuge for the Friends, as Quakers called 
themselves. Like the radical New Englanders to their north, Quaker 
congregations in America aggressively disciplined their members.55 
The basic ecclesiastical unit was the so-called “Monthly Meeting,” 
which would inquire into the actions of members and could formally 
withdraw fellowship from those who did not live up to the standards 
of the Society.56 Several monthly meetings were collected into so-
called “Quarterly Meetings” and “Yearly Meetings,” which exercised 
appellate jurisdiction as well as promulgated rules to govern church 
discipline.57 In many ways, Quaker discipline was aggressive even by 
the standards of discipline-oriented churches. For example, in 
 
 51. See BILL J. LEONARD, BAPTISTS IN AMERICA 8–9, 13–14 (2005). 
 52. See id. at 13–14. 
 53. GREGORY A. WILLS, DEMOCRATIC RELIGION: FREEDOM, AUTHORITY, AND 
CHURCH DISCIPLINE IN THE BAPTIST SOUTH, 1785–1900, at 54 (1997). 
 54. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS 
DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 186–207 (1972) (discussing the origins of Ranters and 
Quakers). 
 55. See Jack Donald Marietta, Ecclesiastical Discipline in the Society of Friends, 1682–
1776, at 4–5 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the 
author). 
 56. Id. at 1–2. 
 57. Id. 
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addition to traditional concerns such as lying, swearing, or sexual 
impropriety, Quakers were subject to discipline for traveling without 
first informing their local “Meeting” or for failing to attend Quaker 
services while visiting a different region.58 
Scholars have long argued that the origins of Mormonism lie in 
New England.59 Although the Church of Christ (later rechristened 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and referred to since 
its inception as the Mormon Church) was organized in upstate New 
York in April, 1830, its founder, Joseph Smith Jr., was born in 
Vermont of old New England stock.60 Perhaps more importantly, 
many of the earliest converts to the new faith in western New York 
and Ohio were displaced New Englanders whose family roots lay in 
the “radical fringe” of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont, precisely the regions where Anabaptist and Quaker 
influence were the strongest.61 Likewise, Joseph Smith found early 
followers in Ohio and the upper reaches of the Susquehanna River, 
regions peopled largely by settlers from Quaker Pennsylvania.62 
 
 58. See id. at 12–13.  
 59. See David Brion Davis, The New England Origins of Mormonism, 26 NEW ENG. Q. 
147 (1953). Writing in the shadow of Perry Miller’s magisterial works on Puritan thought, 
Davis conceptualized Mormonism as a populist—and somewhat silly—attempt to recapture 
Puritanism in the nineteenth century. See id. at 158 (“Mormonism can be seen as the extreme 
result of the evils of literal-mindedness. . . . This anachronistic residue of seventeenth-century 
New England just did not understand the meaning of individualism.”); cf. Charles L. Cohen, 
The Post-Puritan Paradigm of Early American Religious History, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 695, 701 
(1997) (“Miller conceived of Puritanism as a fixed intellectual configuration . . . and he 
diagnosed alterations in sentiment, doctrine, rhetoric, or practice as degeneration from this 
initial scheme. Declension theory’s explanatory force derives from its deducing Puritanism as 
an a priori unity from which every departure must necessarily signify decay.”). 
 60. See RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, JOSEPH SMITH: ROUGH STONE ROLLING 8–29 
(2005) (discussing the New England background of Joseph Smith Jr.’s family). 
 61. This theory of early Mormon demography was first advanced by John Brooke in 
1994. See JOHN L. BROOKE, THE REFINER’S FIRE: THE MAKING OF MORMON COSMOLOGY, 
1644–1844, at 59–88 (1994). Since then, Brooke’s demographic thesis has been significantly 
supported by a much more comprehensive study by Val D. Rust. See VAL D. RUST, RADICAL 
ORIGINS: EARLY MORMON CONVERTS AND THEIR COLONIAL ANCESTORS (2004). For a 
sympathetic critique of Brooke’s interpretation of early Mormonism, see JAN SHIPPS, Thoughts 
About the Academic Community’s Response to John Brooke’s Refiner’s Fire, in SOJOURNER IN 
THE PROMISED LAND: FORTY YEARS AMONG THE MORMONS 204 (2000).  
 62. See BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 52–53 (discussing the genesis of the Colesville 
branch). See also LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FROM QUAKER TO LATTER-DAY SAINT 31 (1976) 
(noting that in its early years Ohio took “half of her non-native increase from Pennsylvania”); 
WHITNEY R. CROSS, THE BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASTIC RELIGION IN WESTERN NEW YORK, 1800–1850, at 4 (1950) 
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These early converts carried their forbearers’ emphasis on church 
discipline into the new movement. The earliest rules for the 
government of the church were contained in the “Articles of the 
Church of Christ” composed in late 1829.63 The “Articles” endorsed 
the baptism of adult believers and insisted on the importance of 
disciplining recalcitrant members.64 “Therefore if ye know that a man 
is unworthy” they stated, “. . . if he repenteth not he shall not be 
numbered among my people that he may not destroy my people.”65 
A few months later, the newly organized church adopted an 
expanded “Articles and Covenants.” This document directed that 
“[a]ny member of the church of Christ transgressing, or being 
overtaken in a fault, shall be dealt with as the scriptures direct . . . 
[a]nd also, if any have been expelled from the church . . . their 
names may be blotted out of the general church record of names.”66  
The emphasis on ecclesiastical purity and church discipline meant 
that adjudication emerged almost immediately as an important facet 
of Mormon religious experience. The earliest judicial procedures 
used by the Latter-day Saints, however, cannot be found in the 
quasi-constitutional “Articles and Covenants.” Rather, the Mormons 
simply adopted procedures used by other discipline-oriented 
churches. Prior to any formal action, teachers “labored” with 
refractory members, urging them to confess their transgressions 
without formal disciplinary action.67 If this did not work, then the 
 
(noting that in western New York, where Mormonism was founded, “a reasonably large 
proportion of folk came up the Susquehanna from Pennsylvania”). 
 63. See Scott H. Faulring, An Examination of the 1829 “Articles of the Church of Christ” 
in Relation to Section 20 of the Doctrine and Covenants, BYU STUD., Winter 2004, at 57. The 
full text of the “Articles of the Church of Christ” is reproduced in Faulring’s article.  
 64. See id. at 77 (“Now therefore whosoever repenteth and humbleth himself before me 
[that is, Jesus Christ] and desireth to be baptized in my name shall ye baptize them.”) 
(quoting the Transcript of the 1829 Articles of the Church of Christ) (brackets not in 
original). 
 65. Id. at 78. 
 66. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 20:80, 83. 
 67. For example, the business of an 1834 meeting of teachers in Kirtland consisted 
entirely of appointing brethren to labor with particular members: “[T]he conference then 
appointed brothers John Taylor and Benjamin Johnson to labor with Orva Cartwright for 
making use of tobacco, also brother Joseph Ceehum (?) was appointed to labor with broth 
Bates & wife also brothers G. Johnson & A.C. Graves was appointed to labor with the widow 
Shaw.” Teachers Quorum Minutes, Dec. 1834–Dec. 1845, Church Archives, The Family and 
Church History Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. See also FAR WEST RECORD: MINUTES OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS, 1830–1844, at 38 (Donald Q. Cannon & Lyndon W. Cook eds., 1983) 
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erring brother or sister would be brought before the local 
“conference” for trial.68 These proceedings were presided over by a 
“moderator” who was elected for the meeting.69 The moderator was 
a familiar character from both Protestant churches and New England 
town meetings, and his purpose was less to act as a judge than to run 
the meeting. Generally, the moderator among Protestants was the 
minister, but with an entirely lay clergy, the office seems to have 
rotated from meeting to meeting among the Mormons.70 There were 
no formal evidentiary or procedural rules. Rather, evidence was 
presented by the parties in the case.71 The assembled members would 
then vote on the verdict.72 The congregational basis and the 
vocabulary used by these earliest Mormon courts were very similar to 
meetings of Baptists or Quakers.73 
While this early pattern of church discipline was retained 
throughout the nineteenth century by Latter-day Saints in Europe 
and the British Isles,74 the Mormon judiciary rapidly began diverging 
from its Protestant antecedents in ways that reflected the religious 
radicalism of Mormonism. Joseph Smith had founded his church on 
the claim that God had chosen him to “restore” the Christian gospel 
 
[hereinafter FAR WEST RECORD] (a conference voted two elders to mediate between two 
quarrelling members).  
 68. See, e.g., FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 15 (“Ezra being absent . . . Cowdery 
be dispatched . . . [to] bring him before this conference immediately.”).  
 69. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“Br Sidney Rigdon appointed moderator.”). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 26–31 (between November 1, 1831 and November 13, 1831 there 
were six conference meetings in Kirtland all with different moderators). However, the role of 
moderator seems to have attached fairly quickly to particular priesthood officers. See, e.g., id. at 
65 (“The Bishop Edward Partridge was acknowledged to be at the head of the Church of Zion 
at present consequently will be our Moderator in councils or conferences by virtue of his 
office.”). 
 71. See, e.g., id. at 15 (“After hearing the relations of all the parties, the conference 
requested them to withdraw while they should investigate the testimony & pass their 
decision.”). 
 72. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“Upon testimony satisfactory to this conference it was voted that 
Ezra Booth be silenced from preaching as an Elder in this Church.”). 
 73. Presbyterian tribunals were different, however, for they accorded the minister 
greater power and restricted adjudication to a council of elders chosen by a vote of the 
congregation. See GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & JAN M. SALTZGABER, REVIVALISM, SOCIAL 
CONSCIENCE, AND COMMUNITY IN THE BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE TRIAL OF RHODA 
BEMENT 151 (1983).  
 74. See Richard L. Jensen, Church Councils and Governance, in MORMONS IN EARLY 
VICTORIAN BRITAIN 179 (Richard L. Jensen & Malcolm R. Thorp eds., 1989). The first 
Mormon missionaries arrived in England in 1837, and the new religion garnered tens of 
thousands of converts in Great Britain and Scandinavia over the following decades. 
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in its original purity.75 Hence, in some sense, Mormonism was simply 
an extreme manifestation of the basic Protestant anxiety about the 
corruption of the Christian church.76 In other respects, however, the 
new movement broke radically with the Protestant tradition from 
which it emerged. First, Smith insisted that he was not a reformer 
but rather a prophet on the biblical model who received knowledge 
directly from angelic visitors and waking theophanies.77 On this basis, 
Smith claimed the right to add additional scripture to the biblical 
canon, which he did first with the Book of Mormon and subsequently 
in a series of written “revelations” given in response to specific 
questions or problems.78 Second, Smith rejected the notion of a 
priesthood of believers, insisting instead that authentic ecclesiastical 
authority could come only by the “laying on of hands” by those who 
could trace their authority through an unbroken chain of ordination 
back to Christ, authority that Smith claimed to have received from 
visiting angels.79 Both of these claims marked Mormonism as a 
heretical sect in the eyes of American Protestantism, and both of 
them contributed to the unique elaboration of the Mormon 
judiciary. 
 
 75. See generally JAN SHIPPS, MORMONISM: THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS 
TRADITION 67–85 (1985) (discussing Mormon restorationism). 
 76. See id. at 68 (“[U]nless the radical character of the Mormon restoration is taken into 
account, and unless careful attention is paid to the particular way in which Mormonism was 
shaped and transformed by the actual practical experience of the community of belief, 
Mormonism can all too readily be misunderstood as a little more than an elaborate 
idiosyncratic strain of the nineteenth-century search for primitive Christianity.”). 
 77. To contemporary ears, Smith’s repeated claims to visions and revelations sound 
startling and unique, marking him off to modern Mormons as a miraculous figure and many 
non-Mormons as a transparent fraud. See Jan Shipps, The Prophet Puzzle: Suggestions Leading 
Toward a More Comprehensive Interpretation of Joseph Smith, J. OF MORMON HIST., Vol.1, 
1974, at 3 (discussing the problem of the prophet-fraud dichotomy in the context of Joseph 
Smith and early Mormonism). However, while Joseph Smith was certainly recognized as a 
religious radical and accused of being an imposter in his own lifetime, he nevertheless operated 
in a religious milieu in which claims to visions and visiting angels were frequent, indeed 
commonplace. See Richard Bushman, The Visionary World of Joseph Smith, BYU STUD., Spring 
1997–98, at 183 (discussing the role that stories of visions and angels played in the religious 
economy of Jacksonian America). 
 78. Many of these revelations were subsequently collected and published in the Doctrine 
and Covenants, both within Joseph Smith’s lifetime and in subsequent editions of the Doctrine 
and Covenants produced after his death. 
 79. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 13 (Joseph Smith’s account of the restoration of 
priesthood authority by an angel). See generally GREGORY A. PRINCE, POWER FROM ON HIGH: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORMON PRIESTHOOD (1995) (discussing the theological and 
institutional development of the Mormon idea of priesthood). 
OMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 6:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2009 
172 
Smith’s position as prophet and conduit of priesthood authority 
centralized a great deal of ecclesiastical power in his hands. Equally, 
if not more important, however, was the way in which Smith 
dispersed prophetic and priestly authority. He insisted that everyone 
had the right to receive personal revelation from God and essentially 
all Latter-day Saint males were given the priesthood. He also set up a 
slew of independent councils that were to receive revelation and 
direct affairs within their appointed areas.80 The result was the 
widespread dispersal of authority away from Joseph Smith. As his 
biographer has observed, “Joseph’s presence was not required to 
make [the councils] work. Instead of councils relying on him to give 
the last word, they met, deliberated, and made policy decisions in his 
absence.”81 Much of the work done by these councils was 
adjudicative, either inquiring into the worthiness of individual 
Mormons accused of sin or settling disputes between Mormons.82 As 
a result, Mormon ideas of personal revelation and priesthood 
authority became intertwined with the emerging Mormon judiciary, 
which was divided into various specialized councils as opposed to the 
earlier congregational procedures. 
These special councils began developing early in the history of 
the new movement. In 1831 Joseph Smith made Edward Partridge a 
“bishop.”83 Thereafter, other men were ordained to the same office. 
Initially, the bishops were associated only with the “temporal affairs 
of the church,” namely the emerging experiments with communal 
economics among Mormons in Ohio and Missouri.84 The bishop 
also, however, became a judicial officer. For example, an 1835 
revelation stated that he was “to be a judge in Israel . . . to sit in 
judgment upon transgressors upon testimony as it shall be laid 
before him according to the laws.”85 In addition, as Smith elaborated 
 
 80. Richard Lyman Bushman, The Theology of Councils, in REVELATION, REASON, AND 
FAITH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TRUMAN G. MADSEN 433, 439–41 (Donald W. Parry et al. eds., 
2002). 
 81. Id. at 433, 440; see also id. at 443 (“In bringing conciliar government into being, 
Joseph not only distributed authority to the councils, but he dispensed the divine gift of 
revelation as well.”). 
 82. Id. at 440–41. 
 83. See BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 254. 
 84. See LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830–1900, at 6–17 (1958) [hereinafter ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN 
KINGDOM] (discussing early Mormon communitarianism and the role of bishops). 
 85. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 107:72. 
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various priesthood offices—deacons, teachers, priests, elders, 
seventies, and high priests—the men in a given area holding each 
office gathered in quasi-fraternal organizations called “priesthood 
quorums.”86 Each of these quorums was presided over by a 
president, and the quorum as a body had limited judicial authority. 
Although it could not excommunicate an erring brother, it could 
formally withdraw the fellowship of the quorum, and adjudication 
emerged as one of their main activities.87  
Smith also established a series of superior councils that eventually 
gelled into a two-tiered appellate structure for the church judiciary. 
In 1832, he announced a revelation creating a body called “the First 
Presidency” consisting of himself and two counselors, which would 
acquire final appellate jurisdiction in the church.88 In 1834, Smith 
further refined the Mormon judiciary by creating a body known as 
“the High Council,” a group of twelve high priests presided over by 
a president, which was to settle “important difficulties which might 
arise in the church, which could not be settled by the church or the 
bishop’s council to the satisfaction of the parties.”89 A year later, 
Smith underlined the centrality of discipline and adjudication to the 
emerging ecclesiastical structure by announcing a revelation creating 
a special procedure for excommunicating the President of the 
Church (Smith himself) should it become necessary, that “none shall 
be exempted from the justice and the laws of God, that all things 
may be done in order and in solemnity before him, according to 
truth and righteousness.”90  
 
 86. See generally DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 20:38–67, 107 (outlining the 
responsibilities of the quorums). 
 87. See generally KIRTLAND ELDERS’ QUORUM RECORD 1836–1841 (Lyndon W. Cook 
& Milton V. Backman, Jr. eds., 1985) (recording numerous disciplinary actions by the Kirtland 
Elders’ Quorum). See also Proceedings Before the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the 
United States Senate in the Matter of the Protests Against the Right of Hon. Reed Smoot, a 
Senator from the State of Utah, to Hold His Seat, S. Doc. No. 486, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906) 
at 3:23 [hereinafter Smoot Hearings] (testimony by James E. Talmage stating that “[a]fter 
proper trial any quorum may disfellowship one of its members”). 
 88. See generally DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 81.  
 89. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 102:2. 
 90. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 107:84. The sometimes fluid nature of the Mormon 
judiciary is illustrated by the disagreements over the years about precisely how the procedure 
for excommunicating the President of the Church should work. At a meeting of the Twelve 
Apostles and the First Presidency on December 24, 1902, Apostle Rudger Clawson recorded: 
Elder Smoot [that is, Reed Smoot] said that there was a diversity of opinion in Utah 
Stake as to who would sit in judgment if the President of the church were placed on 
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However, while the refinement of the Mormon judiciary pushed 
adjudication away from the earlier congregational model into 
specialized tribunals, the possibility of trial by a general vote of the 
membership remained. Joseph Smith taught that “[w]hen there is no 
Bishop, [those subject to discipline] are to be tried by the voice of 
the Church.”91 Similarly, extraordinary cases could be decided by a 
general vote of the church even when other tribunals were 
functioning. For example, in 1886 Joseph Q. Cannon, then a 
counselor to the Presiding Bishop of the Church, was 
excommunicated for adultery by vote of “the public congregation in 
the Big Tabernacle.”92 
 
trial. Some claimed that it would be the right of the Presiding Bishopric to try him. 
Elder Smoot said he did not coincide with this view. The matter might be 
considered inappropriate for discussion, but he thought the council ought to be 
agreed as touching this question. Elder Smoot said that the revelation which 
directed that in case the President of the High Priesthood should [be] put upon 
trial, the Presiding Bishop associated with twelve high priests should constitute the 
trial court, was given before the church was fully organized and before the Twelve 
had been chosen. Pres. Smith [that is, Joseph F. Smith] suggested that the matter be 
taken under advisement for one week, which was done. 
A MINISTRY OF MEETINGS: THE APOSTOLIC DIARIES OF RUDGER CLAWSON 525–26 (Stan 
Larson ed., 1993) (second brackets in original). Clawson did not record the outcome of the 
special committee. However, in 1904, Joseph F. Smith, a nephew of Joseph Smith, Jr. and 
then President of the Church, testified before the U.S. Senate as part of the controversy 
surrounding the seating of Mormon Senator Reed Smoot. Responding to questions by the 
Senators, he stated that he could be tried for his membership before his local bishop’s court 
like any other member, with appeal lying to his stake president, and from thence to a special 
council. See Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 1:352. In an influential work on church 
government published a few decades later, however, Mormon apostle John A. Widtsoe 
described a special procedure based on the 1835 revelation to Joseph Smith, Jr. See JOHN A. 
WIDTSOE, PRIESTHOOD AND CHURCH GOVERNMENT 217 (1939). 
 91. PRINCE, supra note 79, at 198 (citation omitted).  
 92. AN APOSTLE’S RECORD: THE JOURNALS OF ABRAHAM H. CANNON 85–86 (Dennis 
B. Horne, ed. 2004). In his 1904 testimony before the Senate, James E. Talmage also 
suggested that a vote of the general conference of the church also constituted a method of 
extraordinary appeal: 
  An appeal would lie from the first presidency to the assembled quorums of the 
priesthood; that is to say, the church as a body is the supreme court before which 
the cases involving church [sic]. 
  The assembled quorums or organizations of the priesthood may be said to be 
in session at every general conference of the church. But, of course, in the same 
assembly with the quorums of the priesthood standing and church rights may be 
tried. 
Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 3:21 (testimony of James E. Talmage). See also T.B.H. 
STENHOUSE, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN SAINTS 564–66 (1873) (“[T]here is also an appeal to 
the ‘quorum’ of the ‘First Presidency,’ and from that, if desired, to the Church collectively in 
General Conference.”). 
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The proliferating councils eventually settled into a single 
integrated judicial structure. In 1838, after years of intermittent 
violence, the Mormons were driven out of Missouri and settled in 
Illinois along the banks of the Mississippi river where they founded 
the City of Nauvoo. Eventually a bishop was assigned to each of 
Nauvoo’s municipal wards, mainly to look after the needs of the 
poor and to provide a bishop’s court for local members. These 
bishops were under the direction of the President of the Nauvoo 
Stake of Zion and his High Council. This High Council had 
appellate jurisdiction over decisions by the bishop’s courts and local 
priesthood quorums, as well as original jurisdiction in difficult 
cases.93 Other areas of concentrated Mormon settlement were 
organized into other “stakes” with a similar judicial structure.94 In 
some cases, the High Council had a president who was different than 
the president of the stake.95 For much of the nineteenth century, 
there were also “traveling bishops” who operated independent of 
particular wards or congregations.96 The First Presidency then 
exercised appellate jurisdiction over all of the various High Councils. 
In addition, certain councils, such as the Presiding Bishopric, 
retained jurisdiction independent of stake organizations.97 With 
minor refinements, this three-tiered structure of bishops’ courts, 
High Councils, and the First Presidency has survived in the Mormon 
Church to the present day.98  
 
 93. See generally William G. Hartley, Nauvoo Stake, Priesthood Quorums, and the 
Church’s First Wards, BYU STUD., Spring 1991 (illustrating examples of High Council 
appellate jurisdiction in Nauvoo). 
 94. A Mormon “stake” is an ecclesiastical structure consisting of several congregations—
called “wards”—and is roughly equivalent to a Roman Catholic diocese. 
 95. See William G. Hartley, Brigham Young and Priesthood Work at the General and 
Local Levels, in LION OF THE LORD: ESSAYS ON THE LIFE & SERVICE OF BRIGHAM YOUNG 
338, 358 (Susan Easton Black & Larry C. Porter eds., 1995). 
 96. See id.  
 97. The office of “Presiding Bishopric” is independent of the office of an ordinary 
bishop. After the Nauvoo period, bishops emerged as essentially congregational leaders, 
although local ecclesiastical structures remained quite fluid into the late 1870s. However, 
Joseph Smith published a revelation in 1841 creating an office of Presiding Bishop, who was to 
oversee the temporal affairs of the Church at a general level. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 
124:20–21, 141. See also Hartley, supra note 95, at 356–58 (discussing the evolution of the 
office of Presiding Bishopric). 
 98. For many years there was a fourth level in the appellate structure: the Salt Lake Stake 
was considered “the center Stake of Zion” and the Salt Lake High Council had appellate 
jurisdiction over other High Councils, which placed it in a position between the ordinary High 
Councils and the First Presidency. See Hartley, supra note 95, at 359. 
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Unlike the Protestant structures from which it emerged, the 
mature Mormon judiciary was more than simply a congregationally 
based method of policing ecclesiastical purity. It was a single, 
institutionally integrated system that was ideologically related to key 
aspects of Mormon theology. In February, 1834, the Kirtland High 
Council met and “[Brother] Joseph . . . said he would show the 
order of councils in ancient days . . . as shown him by vision the law 
by which to govern the Council of the Church of Christ.”99 Smith 
went on to explain that “Jerusalem was the seat of the Church 
Council in ancient days” and that the procedures he was instituting 
were those that had been used by the apostle Peter, who “was 
appointed to this office by the voice of the Savior.”100 In reaching 
their decisions, the council was to “speak precisely according to the 
evidence and according to the teaching of the Spirit of the Lord.”101 
Likewise, “in cases of difficulty respecting doctrine or principles if 
there is not a sufficiency written to make clear to the mind of the 
council, the president may inquire and obtain the mind of the Lord 
by Revelation.”102 The institutional structure of Mormon courts was 
thus central to the theological narrative of pristine Christianity and 
authentic priestly authority restored in the latter days. Likewise, the 
process of decision making in Mormon courts explicitly rested on 
claims to continuing and immediate revelation from God. In short, 
Mormon courts became a key location in which Latter-day Saints 
experienced the divine and enacted the theological narratives that 
structured their religious beliefs. When the Kirtland Elders Quorum 
chose the Temple as the location to hear the case of Cahoon v. Green 
they were giving concrete expression to this central religious role of 
adjudication. 
II. SUING BEFORE THE UNGODLY AND SUING BEFORE THE 
CHURCH 
A suspicion of secular courts and preference for church tribunals 
emerged within the first generation of Christianity. In his first letter 
 
 99. Kirtland High Council Minutes (Dec. 1834–Nov. 1837), Church Archives, The 
Family and Church History Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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to the Corinthians, Paul rebuked the early Christians for their 
litigiousness, noting with horror that “brother goes to law against 
brother, and that before unbelievers.”103 He asked rhetorically, 
“When one of you has a grievance against a brother, does he dare to 
go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints?”104 These 
passages from the New Testament captured the imagination of 
discipline-minded churches. The emphasis of these churches on 
ecclesiastical purity meant that adjudication was already an important 
part of their religious experience. Equipped with the institutional 
machinery and social practices to manage lawsuits between members, 
they combined Paul’s attack on litigation with a deep-seated 
suspicion of the common-law courts. The result was a series of 
attempts to create religious alternatives to the civil courts, of which 
the Mormon judiciary became an exemplar. 
The Puritans made some attempts to resolve civil litigation in 
church courts. For example, in 1635 the First Church of Boston 
excommunicated one of its members “for extortion, deceipt [sic], 
and lying, in and about Iron Worke which he made for one Mr. 
Jacob.”105 In the end, however, Puritan churches did not become 
heavily involved in resolving civil cases for the same reasons that their 
church discipline as a whole was less vigorous than other sects. Early 
Puritan congregations were made up mainly of non-members and 
the theological accommodation marked by the Half-way Covenant 
dampened the practice of church adjudication.106 Congregationalist 
churches, however, did provide arbitrators from time to time,107 and 
as late as the 1840s Presbyterian churches, which merged with the 
Congregationalists under the 1801 Plan of Union, “frequently 
viewed questionable business practices, even if technically legal, as 
breaches of discipline.”108 Baptists were even more aggressive in 
using their disciplinary machinery to resolve civil disputes: 
Rules prohibited quarreling, litigation between fellow members 
without church consent, the evasion of just debts, especially by 
 
 103. 1 Corinthians 6:6 (RSV). 
 104. 1 Corinthians 6:1 (RSV). 
 105. HASKIN, supra note 45, at 90. 
 106. See MORGAN, supra note 29, at 2–4. 
 107. See, e.g., THE ADAMS PAPERS: THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 20–21 (L. 
Kinvin & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1968) (discussing a dispute over timber submitted to 
arbitration before a church committee). 
 108. ALTSCHULER & SALTZGABER, supra note 73, at 155. 
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taking advantage of the statute of limitations in order to 
circumvent legal collection. An important function of the church 
was to serve as a jury in the settlement of difficulties among its 
members . . . . 109 
The Quakers initially absented themselves from the English legal 
system because their literal interpretation of Christ’s injunction, 
“swear not,”110 meant that they refused to take the oaths that formed 
a necessary part of common-law procedure.111 The result was a turn 
away from the secular courts and toward what the Quakers called 
“The Gospel Order,” a comprehensive system for resolving intra-
Quaker disputes without litigation.112 For example rules adopted by 
the New England Yearly Meeting in 1697 stated that “when any 
friend or friends shall hear of any . . . difference betwixt any friends . 
. . they [shall] forthwith speak to and tenderly advise, the persons 
between whom the differences is, to make a speedy end thereof.”113 
If friendly persuasion did not work, the rules called for ad hoc 
arbitrators. “[T]hey should each choose an equal number of 
different, impartial and judicious friends, to hear and speedily 
determine the same; and that they do bind themselves to stand to 
their award and determination.”114 The Gospel Order, however, 
placed onerous sanctions on any Quaker who instituted a civil 
lawsuit against another “friend” without submitting the dispute to 
arbitration: “[I]f any person professing truth with us, shall . . .  
sue . . . at law, any other of our members, before he hath proceeded 
in the methods herein before recommended . . . then he be 
disowned by the meeting.”115 
Any Quaker thus disciplined could appeal to the quarterly and 
yearly meetings.116 Although there is reason to suppose that intra-
Quaker litigation was considerably more common than the “Gospel 
 
 109. Robert, supra note 33, at 248 (describing church discipline among eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Baptists). 
 110. Matthew 5:34 (KJV). 
 111. OFFUTT, supra note 17, at 147.  
 112. Id. See also Odiorne, supra note 17, at 161 (describing arbitration proceedings 
among the Quakers). 
 113. SOCIETY OF FRIENDS NEW ENGLAND YEARLY MEETING, RULES OF DISCIPLINE OF 
THE YEARLY MEETING HELD ON RHODE ISLAND FOR NEW ENGLAND 3–4 (1849).  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 5–6. 
 116. Id. at 1 (setting forth the procedures in appeals). 
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Order” would suggest,117 one nineteenth-century author insisted 
that “[c]ases, where property is concerned to the amount of many 
thousands, are determined” according to the Gospel Order.118 
The earliest recorded case of a civil dispute in a Mormon tribunal 
was an action for debt, resolved by an Indiana conference in 
December 1831. The minutes of the meeting record that “Brs. 
George Heartley & Oliver Walker then withdrew to settle the 
difficulty between themselves but could not agree[.] Therefore 
decided that two should be appointed by the Moderator.”119 After an 
attempt at mediation failed, the parties “agreed to abide the decision 
of John & Thomas who concluded that Oliver Walker pay George 
Heartly which was his just due.”120 The decision of the arbitrators 
“was laid before the Conference,” and it was only with “much 
cavilling” that the losing party was persuaded “to stand or hold fast 
to his agreement.”121 In the end, however, “they came together as 
brothers and disciples & all matters were settled & buried.”122 
Mormon courts soon moved from arbitration for two willing 
parties to direct jurisdiction over a case. A strikingly high proportion 
of these earliest complaints were for defamation of one kind or 
another. For example, in December 1833 Joseph Smith heard a 
complaint against a  
Bro. Ezekiel Rider . . . who had said many hard things against Bro. 
Whitney, the Bishop of the Church—he said that Bro. Whitney was 
not fit for a Bishop and that he treated the Brethren who came into 
the store with disrespect that he was overbearing and fair would 
walk on the necks of the Brethren &c.123  
In the Quaker context, it has been theorized that the heavy 
preponderance of defamation cases in the ecclesiastical docket 
 
 117. See OFFUTT, supra note 17, at 174–81 (providing a demographic analysis of 
litigation in the Delaware valley suggesting widespread intra-Quaker lawsuits). 
 118. THOMAS CLARKSON, A PORTRAITURE OF QUAKERISM: TAKEN FROM A VIEW OF 
THE EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE, SOCIAL MANNERS, CIVIL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES, AND CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS 70 (1806). 
 119. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 38.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. Interestingly, this earliest foray of Mormon tribunals into arbitration does not 
seem to have been entirely successful. Cannon and Cook write, “Although the problem was 
considered ‘buried’ at this conference, it surfaced again and was a matter of business in 
Kirtland in December 1834.” Id. at 38 n.4. 
 123. Kirtland High Council Minutes, supra note 99. 
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reflects procedural advantages offered by church courts. A plaintiff 
bringing such an action in a secular court risked a defendant who 
“attempt[ed] to prove the truth of the alleged defamatory statement, 
broadcasting to the court day crowd further attacks on the plaintiff’s 
reputation.”124 While nineteenth-century Mormon courts were not 
entirely private affairs, they could offer a less glaringly public 
rehearsal of the original insults. In addition, early Mormons operated 
in an often violent frontier “culture of honor” that “bred deep 
loyalties to friends and family while instilling a fierce urge to avenge 
insults.”125 Church courts provided a way of managing the conflict 
this culture created by transforming insults from a private causus belli 
into ecclesiastical litigation. 
During the 1830s, church courts heard increasing numbers of 
cases involving civil claims such as actions for debt, but the “secular” 
issues in these disputes were frequently tied up in religious and 
political struggles of central importance to the church. For example, 
after Mormons were violently pushed out of Jackson County, 
Missouri, one Mormon lawyer found himself disciplined after 
agreeing to represent Jackson County non-Mormons trying to 
collect debts against fellow Mormons.126 After the Mormons moved 
to Illinois, they dominated political and legal offices in Nauvoo. 
Joseph Smith was elected mayor and served as a judge, studying law 
for a time and boasting that “I am a lawyer; I am a big lawyer and 
comprehend heaven, earth and hell, to bring forth knowledge that 
shall cover up all lawyers, doctors and other big bodies.”127 He also, 
however, preached that “as long as I have a tongue to speak I will 
expose the iniquity of the Lawyiers [sic] and wicked men.”128 Also, 
for the first time in Nauvoo, church courts began treating the mere 
filing of a civil lawsuit by one Mormon against another Mormon as a 
matter for discipline. Using a formula that would be repeated 
countless times in succeeding decades, in November 1842 a member 
 
 124. OFFUTT, supra note 17, at 172. 
 125. BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 295. Cf. DAVID HACKET FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: 
FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 765–71 (1989) (discussing honor and violence among 
backcountry settlers). 
 126. See FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 163.  
 127. TEACHINGS OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH SMITH 279 (Joseph Fielding Smith ed. 
1967). 
 128. WORDS OF JOSEPH SMITH: THE CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF THE NAUVOO 
DISCOURSES OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH 324 (Andrew F. Ehat & Lyndon W. Cook eds., 1980). 
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filed a complaint with the Nauvoo High Council to “prefer a 
charge” for “instituting a suit at Law against me,” an action 
“derogatory to the character of a Christian.”129 
These church councils became increasingly important as the 
Mormons were driven west in the 1840s. A mob murdered Joseph 
Smith in 1844, and the Mormons abandoned Nauvoo in 1846. 
Their final destination was the valley of the Great Salt Lake, but they 
first crossed Iowa to the banks of the Missouri River and founded a 
temporary settlement dubbed “Winter Quarters.” Brigham Young, 
Joseph Smith’s successor, established the “Municipal High Council” 
to govern the settlement. Formally identical to earlier High 
Councils, the Winter Quarter’s High Council exercised an extremely 
expansive jurisdiction, resolving all civil disputes and meting out 
criminal punishments.130 When the vanguard of Mormons arrived in 
the Salt Lake Valley in 1847, they replicated this system. John Smith 
was made president of the Salt Lake Stake with a High Council that 
exercised both civil and criminal authority. The Mormons made an 
early bid for statehood, drafting a constitution modeled on that of 
Illinois and setting up a government for the provisional “State of 
Deseret” in 1849.131 By early 1850, the courts of Deseret took over 
from the Salt Lake High Council. Hence from 1846 until 1850, 
Mormons lived under High Councils that had full civil and criminal 
power. 
Congress rejected the State of Deseret and organized the 
Territory of Utah as part of the Compromise of 1850, providing the 
legal context in which the Mormon courts operated for more than 
four decades.132 The Territorial Legislature was locally elected and 
dominated by Mormons.133 The Territorial Supreme Court, in 
contrast, was staffed with non-Mormon federal appointees, as was 
 
 129. Nauvoo Stake High Council Court Papers (1839–44), n.1, Church Archives, 
(available at The Family and Church History Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah). 
 130. See Edward L. Kimball & Kenneth W. Godfrey, Law and Order in Winter Quarters, 
J. MORMON HIST. Spring 2006, at 180–81 (discussing the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers of the Winter Quarter’s High Council). 
 131. See generally DALE MORGAN, THE STATE OF DESERET 7–29 (1987) (discussing the 
manner in which the Mormons formed the State of Deseret and appealed for statehood); 
PETER CRAWLEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF DESERET (1982).  
 132. See generally Eugene Campbell, Governmental Beginnings, in UTAH’S HISTORY 153 
(Richard D. Poll et al. eds. 1978) (discussing the creation of Utah Territory). 
 133. See id. at 160–64. 
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the territorial executive after President James Buchanan replaced 
Brigham Young as Territorial Governor in 1857.134 The treatment of 
civil cases by the High Councils, however, showed basic continuity 
throughout the period. Plaintiffs filed simple written complaints with 
the clerk of the bishop’s court or High Council.135 Clerks issued 
summons to the defendants.136 Defendants who refused to appear 
risked disfellowshipment or excommunication for “contempt of the 
priesthood.”137 The parties presented evidence, and the council 
issued decisions.138 Appeals could be taken to the High Council and 
the First Presidency, which both tried cases de novo.139 A Mormon 
sued by another Mormon in a secular court could file a counter-
complaint before a church court alleging “unChristian-like 
conduct.”140 The church court would then take jurisdiction over the 
entire dispute and resolve the underlying lawsuit on the merits.141 
Failure to carry the church judiciary’s final decision into effect 
resulted in excommunication.142 
As might be expected, losing parties were not always satisfied 
with the decisions of church courts. For example, in 1847 when one 
victorious plaintiff called at a defendant’s house to claim property to 
which the high council had declared him entitled, the irate defendant 
responded, “The Council might go to hell and be damned[!]”143 In 
another case, a diarist recorded that a losing party in a high council 
case “was dissatisfied with their judgment and told them that it was 
no better than robery [sic].”144 However, one non-Mormon observer 
 
 134. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 142, 244. 
 135. See generally id. at 29–34 (discussing the organization of bishops’ courts and High 
Councils). 
 136. See id. at 29–30 (discussing the process of issuing summons through clerks). 
 137. See id. at 289 (discussing sanctions for refusals to submit to the jurisdiction of 
church courts). 
 138. See id. at 283 (discussing evidentiary rules). 
 139. See id. at 285–87 (discussing appellate procedures). 
 140. See id. at 264–67 (discussing one representative dispute spanning both secular and 
church courts). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. at 287–88 (discussing sanctions for non-compliance with church court 
requirements). 
 143. THE OLD FORT: HISTORIC MORMON BASTION, THE PLYMOUTH ROCK OF THE 
WEST 82 (Nicholas Groesbeck Morgan, Sr. ed. 1964) (showing the reprinted minutes from 
the Great Salt Lake City High Council). 
 144. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER: THE DIARY OF HOSEA STOUT 1844–1861, at 433 
(Juanita Brooks ed. 1964) [hereinafter 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER]. 
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insisted that “[i]n ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the parties are 
satisfied.”145 Indeed, occasionally, “Gentiles,” as Mormons called 
non-Mormons, sued Mormons in church courts rather than secular 
fora. For example, in one case an influential bishop had run-up 
several thousand dollars of debt to a Gentile merchant. The 
merchant “brought suit against the bishop in [a church court] in 
preference to going to law.”146 After a ninety-minute trial, the 
church court ruled that “the bishop should pay the full amount 
within twenty-eight days, or be suspended from his bishopric.”147 
The merchant was satisfied with the decision and offered to pay 
court costs “which [was] declined, for suits in this court were 
without costs.”148 
Although church courts referred to “the law of the Church” and 
“the law of the Lord,” it was unclear what rules—if any—they 
looked to in resolving cases. The basic procedures used by the high 
councils had been given by Joseph Smith in 1834 and remained 
quite stable. During the period of 1846 to 1850, high councils 
promulgated written rules to govern Mormon communities; 
however, they ceased to do so once the legislature began 
operating.149 Even the treatment of these rules, however, reveals 
ambivalence toward formal legislation. For example, the Salt Lake 
High Council promulgated a law dealing with stray livestock that 
imposed substantial fines on the owners of the animals. The council 
subsequently determined that the rule was too harsh and left the 
bishops who applied it with too little discretion. Accordingly, the 
council repealed the rule, however, they “also . . . imposed a fine of 
25 dollars on any one of the Council who divulged the same as they 
wished to let the force of the law do all the good possible after it was 
repealed.”150 
One Mormon tried to explain the rules applied in church courts 
by saying “[t]he laws of the church are revelations. . . . No rule, 
 
 145. Execution of the Laws in Utah [To accompany bill H.R.No. 1089.], H.R. REP. NO. 
21, at 1 (1870) (testimony of Franklin Head, Feb. 28, 1870). 
 146. EDWARD W. TULLIDGE, HISTORY OF SALT LAKE CITY: BIOGRAPHIES 169 (1886). 
 147. Id. at 169–70. 
 148. Id. at 170. 
 149. See, e.g., ORDINANCES PASSED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF GREAT SALT 
LAKE CITY, AND ORDERED TO BE PRINTED (1849) (showing a collection of ordinances 
adopted by the Salt Lake High Council). 
 150. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 334–35. 
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however, is of binding effect until it has been adopted by the people 
to whom it applies.”151 In reality, however, appeals to formally 
canonized revelations decided few cases. In 1870, a Gentile observed 
more accurately that bishop’s courts applied “a sort of wild equity, 
that is generally not far from just.”152 Occasionally, to be sure, 
church courts looked to biblical rules, for example by requiring four-
fold compensation for theft.153 In one case a party appealed to 
“known and justly established usages of law and equity in civilized 
nations.”154 In some instances church courts followed secular law,155 
but they did not hesitate to abandon it, for example by enforcing 
debts discharged in bankruptcy156 or by forging a new system of 
water rights better suited to the arid Great Basin.157 The upper 
reaches of the church’s hierarchy did attempt to create some 
uniformity. For example, in some instances Bishops or High 
Councils facing a difficult issue wrote the First Presidency, and the 
letters sent in reply evidence consistent positions on some points. 
The Church’s then official organ, The Deseret News, also printed 
articles occasionally, presumably penned by church leaders, 
instructing that certain rules be applied in particular situations. 
Finally, high church officials regularly traveled from stake to stake, 
preaching and instructing local leaders on, among other things, the 
proper way of conducting church courts and resolving disputes 
among the Latter-day Saints.158 These meetings also provided 
 
 151. 3 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 20 (testimony of James E. Talmage). 
 152. Execution of the Laws in Utah [To accompany bill H.R.No. 1089.], H.R. REP. NO. 
21, at 1 (1870) (testimony of Franklin Head, Feb. 28, 1870). 
 153. In some cases, Mormon tribunals applied the biblical rules in unusual circumstances. 
John Nebeker described one such case decided in 1847 or 1848: 
There was one case that created a great deal of fun. A certain man persisted in 
keeping a dog. Now a dog would eat pretty much of what, under the circumstances, 
could be eaten by the people and therefore all could not afford to keep dogs. This 
dog stole some biscuits from a man and the fellow borrowed a shot gun and shot 
the dog. The case was brought before me for arbitration, and I gave the man who 
had lost the biscuits the full benefit of the law, namely, allowed him four fold—or 
16 biscuits, which kept the fellow a whole week. 
John Nebeker, Early Justice in Utah, 3 UTAH HIST. Q. 87, 88–89 (1930). 
 154. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 204. 
 155. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 339–40. 
 156. Id. at 342–43. 
 157. Id. at 321. 
 158. See, e.g., AN APOSTLE’S RECORD: THE JOURNALS OF ABRAHAM H. CANNON, supra 
note 92, at 322 (recording sermons given to stake leaders on conduct of church courts by 
Apostle Francis M. Lyman and President George Q. Cannon). 
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opportunities to raise questions of substance and procedure with the 
visiting leaders.159 Despite these mechanisms, however, the Mormons 
never came close to promulgating anything like a religious law code 
governing disputes in their courts. 
This Mormon ambivalence toward substantive legislation was 
linked to Mormon theology. On this point, Mormonism can be 
usefully compared with Islam.160 Both religions claim to be 
completions of the monotheistic tradition, and both were founded 
by prophets who offered the world new sacred texts. Islam, however, 
developed an elaborate jurisprudential theory, the usul al-fiqh, which 
sought to derive a comprehensive legal code from the Qur’an and 
the example (sunna) of the prophet Mohammed.161 There was no 
comparable effort in Mormonism to derive detailed substantive rules 
from Mormon scripture or its founding prophet. Of course, it took 
Islam several centuries to develop a fully elaborated jurisprudence.162 
Hence, one might argue that Mormonism is still too young to invite 
useful jurisprudential comparison to Islam. 
There are deeper differences at work, however, than simply age. 
Islam never developed a corporate identity similar to the Christian 
idea of a church. Rather, as one scholar has written, “every person, as 
such, with no exceptions, was summoned in his own person to obey 
the commands of God: there could be no intermediary, no group 
responsibility, no evasion of any sort from direct confrontation with 
the divine will.”163 Despite this radically individualistic view of 
human relation to the divine, however, the notion of a unified 
 
 159. See, e.g., sources discussed supra note 90. 
 160. The comparison was ubiquitous, if universally pejorative, in the nineteenth century. 
See generally Arnold H. Green, Mormonism and Islam: From Polemics to Mutual Respect and 
Cooperation, BYU STUD., Winter 2001, at 199, 200–09 (discussing the ways in which 
Mormonism and Islam were related to one another during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries). 
 161. See generally NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964). For a detailed 
account of Islamic legal reasoning, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL 
THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH (1997).  
 162. The prophet Mohammed died in 632 A.D. See COULSON, supra note 161, at 22–
23. The usul al-fiqh, however, is dated to a much later period. For example, Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal, the founder of the last of the great schools of classical Islamic jurisprudence died in 
855 A.D. Id. at 71. See also MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: 
CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION, THE CLASSICAL AGE OF ISLAM 319 
(1974) (providing a brief chronology of the development of the four schools of classical 
Islamic jurisprudence—Maliki, Hanifi, Shafi, and Hanbali—between 700 and 855 A.D.). 
 163. HODGSON, supra note 162, at 318. 
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community of the believers (ummah) remained a vital part of Islam. 
These seemingly incommensurable aspirations were mediated in part 
through the usul al-fiqh, which allowed a professional class of jurists 
to impose sufficient consistency to keep Islam’s theological 
individualism from undermining the communal cohesion of the 
believers.164 
Mormonism faced many of these same tensions. Like Islam it 
contains a radically individualistic conception of the human 
relationship to the divine, albeit on a very different metaphysical 
basis. Mormon scripture teaches that the human spirit is uncreated 
and co-eternal with God,165 and that every individual is entitled to 
direct, personal revelation from God.166 The potentially fragmenting 
consequences of such ideas emerged early in Mormon history. In 
response to one associate who had begun receiving revelations 
directed at the new church, Joseph Smith published a counter-
revelation stating “no one shall be appointed to receive 
commandments and revelations in this church excepting my servant 
Joseph Smith, Jun., for he receiveth them even as Moses.”167 Over 
time, Smith created an ever more elaborate ecclesiastical structure—
of which the church courts were a key part—and endowed it with 
enormous theological significance, ultimately identifying the church 
 
 164. To put the point in Weberian terms, the usul al-fiqh served to control and limit the 
charisma of members of the Islamic ummah. See generally HALLAQ, supra note 161, at 21–35 
(introducing the usul al-fiqh as it relates to the different communities of Islam). 
 165. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 93:29 (“Man was also in the beginning with God. 
Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be.”). See also 
TEACHINGS OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH SMITH, supra note 127, at 352 (“We say that God 
himself is a self-existent being. . . . Man does exist upon the same principles.”). 
 166. In the Bible, the prophet Joel says: 
And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit on all flesh; your 
sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your 
young men shall see visions. Even upon the menservants and maidservants in those 
days, I will pour out my spirit. 
Joel 2:28–29 (RSV). Joseph Smith insisted that the Mormon restoration was to be a fulfillment 
of this prophecy. See Joseph Smith—History 1:41, in THE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE (Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1981 ed.) (1851). The Pearl of Great Price has been formally 
canonized by the Mormon Church, along with the Bible, the Book of Mormon, and the 
Doctrine and Covenants. See also DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 1:19–20 (“The weak things of 
the world shall come forth and break down the mighty and strong ones . . . that every man 
might speak in the name of God the Lord, even the Savior of the world”). 
 167. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 28:2. See also BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 120–22 
(discussing the confrontation between Joseph Smith and Hiram Page giving rise to this 
revelation). 
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as a corporate body with the kingdom of God in “the dispensation of 
the fullness of times.”168 Thus, in Mormonism the living prophet and 
the institutional church performed the function that the usul al-fiqh 
performed in Islam, protecting the religious community from the 
anarchic forces of its own individualistic theology. As Remi Brague 
has put it: 
In Islam . . . the development of a more and more precise sharia 
that demanded more and more clearly a direct connection to the 
origins and become more and more incarnate in a class of jurists 
ended up rendering superfluous a caliph who claimed to unite in 
his person the political authority of the head of state and the 
religious authority of the successor to the Prophet.169 
In contrast, Mormons felt no religious need to elaborate a clear body 
of substantive law. Indeed, to the extent that such a body of law 
would have placed the exegesis of sacred texts in competition with 
living prophets, or the church as an institution, it was anathema to 
Mormon theology. In contrast, the largely ad hoc approach that 
Mormon courts adopted—“a sort of wild equity”170—was both 
sufficient to the dispute resolution needs of frontier society and 
consonant with their own religious beliefs. 
The Mormons struggled to create effective enforcement 
mechanisms for their church courts. Previous writers have tended to 
assume that, with the exception of the 1846–1850 interlude, the 
threat of excommunication was the only method by which the 
decisions of church courts could be enforced.171 To be sure, in the 
context of closely knit Mormon communities excommunication 
carried a heavy cost, including social ostracism and even commercial 
 
 168. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 128:20–21. For an excellent discussion of the tension 
within Mormon culture between individualistic and corporate or authoritarian elements of 
Mormon theology, see TERRYL L. GIVENS, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: A HISTORY OF MORMON 
CULTURE 3–19 (2007). 
 169. REMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 258 
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2006). 
 170. Execution of the Laws in Utah [To accompany bill H.R.No. 1089.], H.R. REP. NO. 
215, at 1 (1870) (testimony of Franklin Head, Feb. 28, 1870). 
 171. See, e.g., FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 287 (“The church court system 
relied on the voluntary submission of church members to its decision. While the state courts 
enforced decisions with fines, imprisonment, and even death, church courts could only 
disfellowship or excommunicate recalcitrant church members.”). 
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boycott.172 This, however, is not the whole story. Prior to 1874, the 
church courts were only one part of a web of Mormon legal 
institutions and practices. Mormons dominated the Territorial 
Legislature, and they used their power to limit the authority of 
lawyers and the common law they represented. First, the Legislature 
very pointedly refused to pass a reception statute making the 
common law binding in the territory, instead commanding that “no 
laws nor parts of laws shall be read, argued, cited, or adopted in any 
court . . . except those enacted by the Governor and Legislative 
Assembly.”173 They also abolished technical common-law 
pleadings.174 Next, they struck at lawyers by stating that no person 
employing an attorney “shall be compelled by any process of law to 
pay the counsel so employed.”175 The same law rejected the 
adversary system by requiring lawyers to “present all the facts in the 
case, whether they are calculated to make against his client or 
not.”176  
In addition, the legislature created Mormon-dominated courts as 
an alternative to the Gentile-dominated Territorial Supreme Court 
and district courts. They did this in two ways. First, the 
congressional act creating Utah Territory gave to the legislature the 
power to create probate courts. Building on a practice common in 
 
 172. See, e.g., Richard S. Van Wagoner & Mary C. Van Wagoner, Orson Pratt, Jr.: Gifted 
Son of an Apostle and an Apostate, DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 1988, at 84, 91 
(mentioning the boycott of the business of an apostate Mormon in a remote southern Utah 
settlement); Ronald G. Watt, Sailing “The Old Ship Zion”: The Life of George D. Watt, BYU 
STUD., Fall 1977, at 48 (“In 1874, however, Watt lost his membership in the Church . . . . 
After his excommunication, old friends ignored him and his obscurity began.”). 
 173. Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah Territory, 1850–61, 
DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 1988, at 97, 102 (internal quotations omitted).  
 174. An Act Concerning the Judiciary, and for Judicial Purposes §10, in ACTS, 
RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS PASSED BY THE FIRST ANNUAL AND SPECIAL SESSIONS OF 
THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH (1852) [hereinafter 1852 ACTS] 
(“Immaterial variancies [sic], errors, or defects, may be disregarded . . . .”). See generally 
Homer, supra note 173, at 97 (discussing the history of the common law in nineteenth-
century Utah). 
 175. An Act for the Regulation of Attorneys § 2, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. In 
addition, the Territories homestead exemption preserved “the proper tools, instruments, or 
books of any farmer, mechanic, surveyor, physician, teacher, or professor.” An Act Concerning 
the Judiciary, and for Judicial Purposes § 22, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. The books of 
lawyers and attorneys may have been pointedly omitted.  
 176. An Act for the Regulation of Attorneys § 5, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. A lawyer 
failing to comply with this provision was to “be liable to all the penalty hereinbefore provided 
for, and the further penalty of not less than one dollar at the discretion of the court.” Id. 
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many western territories dissatisfied with carpet-bagging judges, the 
legislature gave these probate courts “power to exercise original 
jurisdiction both civil and criminal.”177 The probate judges, in turn, 
were chosen by the legislature and almost without exception they 
were Mormons.178  
Second, the legislature adopted a series of laws apparently 
designed to make the decisions of church courts legally binding. 
They did this by taking an extremely liberal attitude toward 
arbitration. “By the consent of the Court and the parties, any person 
may be selected to act as Judge for the trial of any particular cause or 
question,” stated the territory’s first judiciary act.179 Elsewhere, the 
law declared that “[a]ny matter involving litigation may be referred 
to arbitrators” chosen by either the parties or the court.180 These 
arbitrators had extensive powers. A judge chosen by the parties, said 
the law, “shall possess all the powers of the District Judge in the 
case.”181 Likewise, arbitrators had the “authority to subpoena 
witnesses, administer oaths, or affirmations, and issue process as the 
Court.”182 Decisions of arbitrators were to be treated by clerks and 
marshals “in the same manner, as if the case had been prosecuted 
and decided in the usual manner.”183 Most intriguingly, a special law 
 
 177. An Act in Relation to the Judiciary § 30, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. See EARL S. 
POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1861–1890, at 59–60 (1947). See also 
Jeffery Ogden Johnson, Was Being a Probate Judge in Pioneer Utah a Church Calling? 1 (May 
2006) (unpublished paper presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Mormon History Association 
in Casper, Wyo.) (on file with author) (noting that other territories created locally staffed 
courts as a way of undermining the control of federally appointed judges).  
 178. See generally Elizabeth D. Gee, Justice for All or for the “Elect”? The Utah County 
Probate Court, 1855–72, 48 UTAH HIST. Q. 129, 136 (1980) (noting that most of the judges 
presiding over the probate court also held high church offices); Jay E. Powell, Fairness in the 
Salt Lake County Probate Courts, 38 UTAH HIST. Q. 256 (1970) (examining the impartiality of 
probate court in Salt Lake during its early years of operation); James B. Allen, The Unusual 
Jurisdiction of County Probate Courts in the Territory of Utah, 36 UTAH HIST. Q. 132 (1968) 
(exploring the Mormon church’s influence on civil affairs as a result of probate judges being 
elected by the legislature); Johnson, supra note 177; Jay Emerson Powell, An Analysis of the 
Nature of the Salt Lake County Probate Court’s Role in Aggravating Anti-Mormon 
Sentiment, 1852–1855 (June 1968) (Honors Thesis, Department of History, University of 
Utah ) (on file with Howard W. Hunter Law Library, Brigham Young University) [hereinafter 
Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment] (analyzing the operation of the Salt Lake County Probate 
court during those years). 
 179. An Act in Relation to the Judiciary §11, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. 
 180. Id. § 45. 
 181. Id. § 11. 
 182. Id. § 45. 
 183. Id. 
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called for each county to “elect a council of twelve select men as 
referees, whose duty it shall be to decide all cases in litigation which 
may come before them by the mutual consent of the parties.”184 This 
body of men sounds tantalizingly like a local High Council, which 
also consisted of twelve men.185 In addition to the number chosen, 
the territorial act borrows language from one of Joseph Smith’s 
revelations on church courts, declaring that once the Referees make a 
decision it “shall be the end of all controversy in the matter.”186 In a 
sermon denouncing litigation, Brigham Young explicitly associated 
the church courts with this territorial legal structure: 
There is not a righteous person, in this community, who will have 
difficulties that cannot be settled by arbitrators, the Bishop’s Court, 
the High Council, or by the 12 Referees (as provided in Resolution 
No. 4, page 390 of Utah Laws), far better and more satisfactory 
than to contend with each other in law courts . . . .187 
Under territorial law, however, the jurisdiction of such 
arbitrators was neither wholly voluntary nor were their decisions 
wholly hortatory. Rather, parties could be required by a court to 
submit to arbitration,188 arbitrators exercised the procedural powers 
of secular judges,189 and their decisions were legally binding.190 
Hence, to the extent that church courts acted as the arbitrators 
 
 184. Resolution in Relation to Election of Twelve Select Men, or Referees, in 1852 
ACTS, supra note 174. 
 185. See Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment, supra note 178, at 28–29 (“There has been 
some speculation that the effect of this resolution may have been to give legal status to the 
decisions of local high councils, but there is not enough evidence concerning the selection or 
actions of these men to permit drawing any conclusions.”). 
 186. Resolution in Relation to Election of Twelve Select Men, or Referees, in 1852 
ACTS, supra note 174. Compare DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 107:83 (“And their decision 
upon his head shall be an end of controversy concerning him.”). 
 187. Brigham Young, Lawyers, and Those Who Practice Attending Law Courts, Rebuked—
A Curse Pronounced upon All Who Love Litigation and Do Not Repent, in 3 JOURNAL OF 
DISCOURSES 238 (George D. Watts et al. eds., 1856). 
 188. An Act Concerning the Judiciary, and for Judicial Purposes §11, in 1852 ACTS, 
supra note 174. 
 189. See id. § 11 (a person chosen to decide a case “shall possess all the powers of the 
District Judge in the case”); id. § 45 (“[A]rbitrators have authority to subpoena witnesses, 
administer oaths, or affirmations, and issue process as the Court.”). 
 190. See id. § 45 (“And when they shall have made their decision, shall report the  
case . . . to the Clerk of the County in which the case has arisen . . . and it shall be the duty of 
the Clerk . . . [to] proceed in the same manner, as if the case had been prosecuted and decided 
in the usual manner.”); Resolution in Relation to Election of Twelve Select Men, or Referees, 
in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174.  
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under any of these laws, they exercised in theory a power 
substantially identical to that held by secular trial judges.  
It is not at all clear, however, that this legal machinery ever 
functioned as intended. There are no reported cases invoking the 
provisions governing arbitration. Furthermore, ultimate control of 
the territorial judiciary lay in the hands of Gentile appointees who 
were often actively hostile to the Territorial Legislature. One of the 
earliest of these judges declared “that the Utah laws are founded in 
ignorance” and could thus be ignored,191 insisting in one case that 
“[t]he law must be construed by men learned in the Law, and not by 
virtue of any Priesthood.”192 A later court declared that the 
Mormons had “tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles of the 
Common Law suited to their conditions,” despite the explicit earlier 
territorial legislation to the contrary, which the court ignored.193 
Finally, in 1874, Congress passed an act abolishing the extensive 
jurisdiction of the probate courts as part of an effort to facilitate 
polygamy prosecutions by increasing Gentile control of the territorial 
judiciary.194 In short, the courts disregarded the statutes passed by 
the Territorial Legislature, which were also met with congressional 
hostility. 
It is difficult to gauge how successful the Mormons ultimately 
were at suppressing intra-Mormon litigation. In his annual message 
to the Legislature in 1850, then-Governor Young reported proudly 
that not a single lawsuit had been heard before the district courts of 
the territory.195 The diary of Hosea Stout, a Mormon attorney active 
 
 191. Letter from Samuel W. Richards, member of the Utah Legislature, to his brother 
(Dec. 7, 1855), in EDWARD W. TULLIDGE, HISTORY OF SALT LAKE CITY 145 (1886). 
 192. People v. Green, 1 Utah 11, 15 (1876). 
 193. First Nat’l Bank v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100, 107 (1873) (holding that the Statute of 
Frauds had been tacitly accepted in Utah). Ironically, while the Territorial Supreme Court 
essentially ignored early territorial enactments attempting to exclude the common law, those 
territorial statutes have been invoked more recently by the Utah Supreme Court as aids in 
interpreting the Utah State Constitution. See Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. 
Co., 1999 UT 18, ¶¶ 13132, 974 P.2d 1194 (citing territorial statutes).  
 194. See Poland Act, Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253 (1874). At about the 
same time, a case reached the Utah Territorial Supreme Court on the jurisdiction of the Utah 
probate courts. The justices ruled that the Territorial Legislature had exceeded its power under 
Utah’s Organic Act by endowing the probate courts with unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction. 
See Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah 112, 119–20 (1873). 
 195. Homer, supra note 173, at 98. 
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in this period, however, records numerous lawsuits.196 Unfortunately, 
virtually all of the records of civil cases by the Utah Territorial 
Courts were either lost or destroyed. Hence it is difficult to compile 
an accurate picture of civil litigation in Mormon country during the 
nineteenth century. Records of the Mormon-dominated probate 
courts do exist, and detailed studies of two of the most important of 
these courts reveal an ambiguous picture.197 Analysis of the Utah 
County Probate Court shows that Gentiles were much more likely to 
institute civil litigation than were Mormons. Seventy-three percent of 
the plaintiffs were Gentiles, who never constituted more than 
seventeen percent of the population prior to 1874 when the 
jurisdiction of the probate courts was sharply limited.198 On the 
other hand, of civil cases litigated to judgment, more than half 
involved Mormons suing other Mormons.199 A study of the Salt Lake 
County Probate Court between 1852 and 1855 revealed that intra-
Mormon litigation constituted thirty percent of all litigation 
involving Mormons.200 It is possible, of course, that this intra-
Mormon litigation only occurred after trying to unsuccessfully 
resolve the case in a church court, which would be in line with 
ecclesiastical procedure.201 A more likely interpretation, however, is 
 
 196. See 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 363 (entry for Mar. 5, 
1850: “Instituted a suit against Robt Porter & Peter Lish for tresspassing [sic] on the property 
of Lewis Vasques”); id. at 364 (entry for Mar. 9. 1850: “. . . I also prosecuted another Suit H. 
S. Eldrege V.S Mr Long for killing an ox which did not belong to him”); Id. at 367 (entry for 
Apr. 22, 1850: “Attended a trial Dan Jones Vs E. Williams in matter of debt as council for 
Jones”); Id. at 370 (entry for May 30, 1850: “Attending to Legal business Sally Murdoc V.S. 
S. O Holmes in matter of debt”); id. at 378 (entry for Aug. 21, 1850: “Still engaged in Legal 
business Bullar vs Tolton in debt on part of Tolton”). 
 197. See generally Gee, supra note 178 (examining the records of the Utah County 
Probate Court); Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment, supra note 178 (examining the records of 
the Salt Lake County Probate Court). 
 198. Gee, supra note 178, at 139. 
 199. See id. at 144 (showing that for the period studied, twenty-one cases involving 
Mormon plaintiffs and Mormon defendants were litigated to judgment, while only nineteen 
other civil cases received a final judgment on the merits). 
 200. See Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment, supra note 178, at 74 (showing twenty-five 
resident vs. resident cases out of a total of eighty-three cases involving residents); id. at 48 
(“While residency and membership in the Mormon Church can be generally equated during 
this period, there were undoubtedly a few non-member residents. What the Utah emigration 
list yields is specifically Mormon emigration; so technically what we have is a Mormon/non-
Mormon split.”). 
 201. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, surpa note 17, at 267–71 (discussing procedures that 
allowed intra-Mormon litigation). 
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that while the church judiciary limited litigation among Latter-day 
Saints, it never came close to eliminating it. 
In part, the Mormon attempt to opt out of civil litigation 
reflected dissatisfaction with the expense and contentiousness of 
common-law adjudication. For example, church president Wilford 
Woodruff wrote to one stake president in 1896 that 
“[h]eartburnings, bitterness, and ill-feeling invariably attend lawsuits, 
whichever way they terminate, and we are desirous to stop litigation 
among the members of the church.”202 Likewise, one prolific critic of 
Brigham Young and Mormonism nevertheless insisted that “[t]he 
judicial department of the priesthood . . . has saved the brethren and 
sisters all the trouble and expense of lawsuits when differences have 
arisen among them.”203 Another key concern was communal unity. 
The strenuous efforts of nineteenth-century Mormons were directed 
toward “the building up of Zion,” a vision of the godly society that 
was to be achieved by the Latter-day Saints in the here and now of 
Jacksonian Missouri and later the expanses of the Great Basin.204 
Central to the idea of Zion was the need for harmony and unity. 
“[I]f ye are not one,” God declares in the text of one of Joseph 
Smith’s revelations, “ye are not mine.”205 The “heartburnings” of 
litigation were a threat to this unity, and the expansive jurisdiction of 
church courts sought—with uneven success to be sure—to maintain 
the communal harmony central to this vision of Zion. They also 
served to heighten the divide, so important for nineteenth-century 
 
 202. Quoted in 2 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 17. 
 203. STENHOUSE, supra note 92, at 564. Likewise, J.H. Beadle, the editor of THE 
CORRINE REPORTER and an activist in anti-Mormon politics, testified before Congress: 
Well, I will do our bishop—we call him “our bishop” in accordance with the 
universal custom—the credit to say that, where no special interests of his religion are 
involved, he generally does substantial justice. He knows nothing of law; but in 
ordinary cases, when not instructed by the “council,” he will use his best judgment, 
and generally do nearly right. 
Laws in Utah, Additional Testimony, H.R. 21 at 10–11, Serial Set Vol. No. 1436, Session Vol. 
No. 1, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870) (testimony of J.H. Beadle, Feb. 11, 1874). Note, from 
Beadle’s testimony it is difficult to tell if he is referring to the local bishop’s court or the local 
probate court of which the bishop was a judge.  
 204. See generally ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM, supra note 84 (discussing the 
concept of Zion and its relationship to the communitarianism of Mormon economic 
experiments). See also LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FERAMORZ Y. FOX & DEAN L. MAY, 
BUILDING THE CITY OF GOD: COMMUNITY & COOPERATION AMONG THE MORMONS (2d ed. 
1992) (same). 
 205. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 38:27. 
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Mormons, between the Saints and “the World.” The secular courts 
represented the Babylon out of which the Latter-day Saints had been 
gathered, while the church courts were identified with the Zion to 
which they had fled. 
The Mormon objection to “suing before the ungodly,” however, 
was also tied up with the spectacle of litigation. “Court day” was an 
important civic ritual in nineteenth-century America. Few towns had 
permanent magistrates above the level of justices of the peace, and 
more complicated cases were handled by circuit courts that met—
usually twice a year—at county seats. These gatherings were major 
social, economic, and political events. During the colonial period, 
they served to enact social hierarchies, with genteel magistrates 
decked out in the regalia of royal authority.206 In Massachusetts, for 
example, traveling justices were met at the county line by the sheriff, 
who would accompany them to the court house, where “[t]rumpets 
and drums or firearm volleys announced the justices’ arrival in 
town.”207 After independence, court day continued to enact social 
hierarchies,208 but it also developed into a rollicking democratic 
carnival.209 Court sessions were accompanied by peddlers on the 
courthouse square hawking their wares, which generally included a 
generous amount of alcohol. Drunken fights were common. Indeed, 
 
 206. See, e.g., RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA: 1740–1790, at 88–94 
(1982) (discussing court day in colonial Virginia); A.G. Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom: 
The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater, Virginia, 1720 to 1750, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 29 (1980) 
(same). 
 207. MARTHA J. MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO COURTHOUSE: ARCHITECTURE & 
RITUAL IN AMERICAN LAW, 1658–1860, at 12 (2004).  
 208. See, e.g., Ariela Julie Gross, Pandora’s Box: Slavery, Character, and Southern Culture 
in the Courtroom, 1800–1860, at 205–17 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford 
University) (on file with author) (discussing the role of the planter elite in court-day rituals in 
Nachez, Mississippi during the 1830s). 
 209. See, e.g., Life in the Backwoods: Scraps from the Note-Book of a Missouri Lawyer, 
SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: A CHRONICLE OF THE TURF, AGRICULTURE, FIELD SPORTS, 
LITERATURE AND THE STAGE, Sept. 19, 1846, at 355, 356 (“A session of the Circuit Court 
not only draws together the parties litigant, their witnesses and friends, but a host of others, 
who attend out of curiosity, or for a frolic, or to trade horses, or to make up a scrub race, or to 
make a promised settlement; for ‘Court week’ is the time generally designated for a settlement 
of accounts.”); Sketches of Life in Missouri, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: A CHRONICLE OF THE TURF, 
AGRICULTURE, FIELD SPORTS, LITERATURE AND THE STAGE, Feb. 29, 1840, at 614 (“The 
Circuit Court for the district had that day commenced its sittings, and the town, a neat little 
germ of a hamlet, was thronged with suitors, witnesses, lawyers, and the farmers from the 
surrounding country . . . . [T]he busy ‘hum of preparation’ could be heard in every quarter of 
the town.”).  
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they were part of the appeal of court day, as one diarist complained 
in 1807 “a very Poor Court, no fighting or Gouging, very few 
Drunken people.”210 One veteran lawyer described Illinois court days 
in the 1840s and 1850s, noting that “the local belles came in to see 
and be seen” and the work continued in the court house “from 
‘early morn till dewy eve’” while ribaldry in the tavern continued 
“from dewy eve to early morn.”211 George C. Cooke’s 1834 painting 
Patrick Henry Arguing the Parson’s Case in the Hanover County 
Courthouse anachronistically provides an image of the kind of 
communal drama associated with a nineteenth-century court day.212 
The lawyer stands in a small but packed courtroom. The spectators, 
who are intently focused on his oratory, crowd around a rough-hued 
bench where the lawyers sit. They spill out the open door into the 
square beyond. In the foreground a pair of children play in the 
courtroom with a hoop and stick, while in the background we see 
the sign for a tavern that waits to refresh the crowd of thirsty 
spectators. Indeed, there was a symbiotic relationship between 
courthouses and taverns. Many frontier courts sat in the public 
rooms of taverns in the absence of courthouses.213 Likewise, in some 
cases taverns were purposefully established close to courthouses to 
service the people who gathered to watch the judges and lawyers.214 
In short, 
[c]ourtroom trials . . . provided prime entertainment for the 
community. [C]ourtrooms were always crowded because the 
drama, tragedy, and comedy of real life occurred there. With judges 
and lawyers as the star actors, the courtroom substituted for 
theater, concert halls, and the opera. Spectators in the courtroom 
 
 210. LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 8. See also DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 105–
06 (1995) (discussing court day in antebellum Illinois and noting the abundance of whiskey, 
gambling, and fighting). 
 211. HENRY C. WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN 42 (Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd. 2000) (1892). 
 212. The original is housed in the Virginia Historical Society. Most of the detail in the 
painting is anachronistic and “more in keeping with early nineteenth-century designs on the 
frontier.” LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 152. 
 213. See MCNAMARA, supra note 207, at 12. 
 214. See LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing courthouses “and important private 
buildings, especially the taverns, that grew up around them”). 
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expected a good show from the lawyers, the judges, the witnesses 
and the other participants.215 
It was precisely this theatrical aspect of litigation, however, that 
concerned the Mormons. 
On February 24, 1856, Brigham Young delivered a blistering 
sermon against lawyers and law courts.216 He began his denunciation 
by describing the performance of a lawyer that he had observed the 
day before. “[H]e was so serious, so religious, so pious, and so 
honest, that he appealed to high heaven to witness his honesty 
before the jury,” said Young, but “[w]hen he had induced the jury 
to believe that he was honest, he stood there and misrepresented the 
merits of the case, for half an hour at a stretch, in regular lawyer 
style.”217 Such conduct, he insisted, was particularly objectionable 
when done by Mormon lawyers at the instigation of Mormon clients. 
“Does the Lord love your conduct when you drag each other before 
the ungodly? . . . Do you think He has fellowship with your conduct 
in such things? No, you do not.”218 However, while Young’s remarks 
were “severe upon the lawyers”219 (and their clients), he spent the 
bulk of the sermon castigating the spectators at the trial. 
It is a shame for men to be found loafing about in such places, 
where there is contention, and quarrelling, and every stratagem 
that can be used to deceive juries and witnesses, and lying before 
them with all the grace and sanctity of a Saint, pretending to be 
 
 215. John A. Lupton, A. Lincoln, Esquire: The Evolution of a Lawyer, in A. LINCOLN, 
ESQUIRE: A SHREWD, SOPHISTICATED LAWYER IN HIS TIME 18, 18–19 (Allen D. Spiegel ed., 
2002). 
 216. Young’s remarks came as the confrontation between local Mormons and Gentile 
federal appointees over control of the Territorial government heated up prior to President 
Buchanan’s decision to launch the so-called “Utah War.” See Dale D. Goble, Theocracy vs. 
Diversity: Local vs. National in Territorial Utah, in LAW IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 
293, 296 (Gordon Morris Bakken ed., 2000) (noting that in the wake of Young’s remarks 
“[m]obs sacked the offices of non-Mormon lawyers; federally appointed judges were 
threatened”). While Goble is correct to locate Young’s remarks in the context of pre-Utah War 
tensions, the mob attack he refers to actually took place some ten months later in December 
1856, after Justice George P. Stiles, an apostate Mormon appointed to the Territorial bench, 
sought to displace the Mormon Territorial Marshall with the non-Mormon U.S. Marshall, thus 
eroding Mormon influence on the judiciary. See NORMAN F. FURNISS, THE MORMON 
CONFLICT, 1850–1859 at 57–58 (1960) (discussing the confrontation between the Mormons 
and Justice Stiles). 
 217. Young, supra note 187, at 237.  
 218. Id. at 238–39. 
 219. Id.  
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one. Such a place is darker to me than midnight darkness.220 
In part, he was appalled at the idleness of the spectators. Such 
men, he said, ought to be “raising grain, potatoes, and other articles 
of food, instead of following after courts and the nonsense, 
wickedness, and lying associated with them.”221 It was not simply the 
waste of time, however, that attracted Young’s wrath. Rather, he 
thought that the spectacle itself was degrading. “Elders of Israel . . . 
throng to such a place, and that too when no spirit reigns there but 
the devil’s spirit . . . . [Y]ou can get nothing from that den but the 
principles of hell.”222 Even more colorfully, he called the show of 
litigation “[t]he fog, the froth, and spawn of hell, and they [that is, 
the spectators] feast upon it.”223 
Young’s attack on litigation is reminiscent of puritanical sermons 
against the theater over the centuries.224 While Young himself was 
not opposed to drama,225 his attack on litigation shares with the 
religious denunciation of theaters a basic concern for the moral 
consequences of watching sin and wickedness as entertainment. In 
Young’s view, litigation was a battle of wits between amoral lawyers, 
an exciting spectacle but ultimately a degrading one. It was not 
simply the contentiousness of litigation or the dishonesty of the 
lawyers themselves that was objectionable. It was the moral impact 
on the community of placing such a spectacle at the center of civic 
life. Seen in these terms, the move to bring litigation within the 
church was a move to transform the public meaning of dispute 
resolution.  
To be sure, prior to the arrival of the first Gentile appointees to 
the Utah Territorial bench, the Mormons had their own muted 
version of court day. In 1852, shortly after the Territory of Utah was 
organized, Zerubabbel Snow, a Mormon attorney who had been 
 
 220. Id. at 238. 
 221. Id. at 239. 
 222. Id. at 238. 
 223. Id. at 239. 
 224. See GIVENS, supra note 168, at 143–45 (discussing religious denunciations of the 
theater). 
 225. See id. at 145–49 (discussing Young’s support for the theater in pioneer Utah); 
Richard Cracroft, “Cows to Milk Instead of Novels to Read”: Brigham Young, Novel Reading, 
and Kingdom Building, BYU STUD., Summer 2001, at 102, 112–13 (“It is pleasing and 
instructing to see certain characters personified upon the boards of a theatre . . . [that] is 
managed upon righteous principles.” (quoting Brigham Young)). 
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appointed Chief Justice of the new Territorial Supreme Court, rode 
circuit through the far-flung settlements inaugurating the first 
district courts. However, he did not enter town as the head of a 
judicial entourage with lawyers in tow. Rather, he came as a small 
part of a much larger party led by Brigham Young, who spoke to the 
citizens as Territorial Governor and—far more importantly from 
their point of view—preached to them as living prophet and leader 
of their church.226 In this theo-political pageant Justice Snow was a 
decidedly small player.227  
In place of the secular ritual of court day, the church courts 
offered their own set of public symbols. In at least some cases, 
adjudication was open to the public, and local newspapers sometimes 
even announced church trials in advance.228 For example, during the 
1850s, the Salt Lake High Council heard cases each Saturday in the 
Salt Lake Social Hall before large groups of spectators who were 
occasionally called upon to participate in the proceedings. Men in 
the audience might be asked to replace a high councilor who was 
absent or who recused himself from a particular case.229 Likewise, in 
one 1859 case the minutes record, “The Persons present in the room 
were called upon and also unanimously sustained the decision about 
fifty persons present besides the authorities and council.”230 While 
parties occasionally retained attorneys to represent them before a 
high council—particularly when resort to the church court was one 
move in protracted litigation spanning both secular and ecclesiastical 
tribunals—generally speaking lawyers were excluded from the 
 
 226. See Journal of William Clayton (May 12, 1852), in AN INTIMATE CHRONICLE: THE 
JOURNALS OF WILLIAM CLAYTON 411–12 (George D. Smith ed., 1995) (recounting Justice 
Snow’s inaugurating circuit court sittings while touring the territory with Brigham Young). See 
also LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, BRIGHAM YOUNG: AMERICAN MOSES 306–10 (2d ed. 1991) 
(discussing Brigham Young’s tours through Utah Territory as Governor). 
 227. See DONALD, supra note 210, at 104–05 (describing a caravan of circuit-riding 
lawyers with the judge at their head). 
 228. Salt Lake High Council minutes report that in early cases when members were 
absent, “[t]he vacancies were filled from bystanders.” See, e.g., THE OLD FORT, supra note 
143, at 76, 79. See, e.g., Bountiful Briefs, DAVIS COUNTY CLIPPER, Jan. 27, 1899, at 1 (“The 
Bishop’s court is trying the Smedley-Goodfellow case this week.”). 
 229. See THE OLD FORT, supra note 143, at 76, 79. 
 230. Ecclesiastical Court Cases Collection, Disfellowshipment Records, 1839–1965, CR 
355, 2, 1858, n.2, Church Archives, The Family and Church History Department, The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah (transcript in author’s 
possession). 
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proceedings.231 In accordance with rules laid down by Joseph Smith, 
however, an equal number of high councilors were assigned to speak 
on either side of a case when the council deliberated.232 The rule was 
less of a surrogate for representation than a device to ensure the 
appearance (and hopefully the reality) of even-handed deliberation. 
Likewise, the absence of technical rules of evidence was supposed to 
ensure that church courts could reach the truth of the matter.233 In 
contrast, said Young, “juries are liable to be deceived.”234 Perhaps 
most dramatically, decisions by church courts frequently required 
erring parties to publicly confess their sins before their congregations 
and quarrelling members were often required to engage in acts of 
public reconciliation.235 In short, ecclesiastical courts transformed 
adjudication from a spectacle of amoral attorneys engaged in a battle 
of wits into an essentially Christian drama of sin, confession, 
reconciliation, and public redemption, a fact not lost on 
contemporary observers. For example, one diarist recorded the 
deliberations in an 1843 case using the language of Christian 
atonement, noting “Hyrum plead for mercy, Joseph for Justice, 
[and] the Twelve decided according to testimony . . . .”236 The goal, 
 
 231. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 366 (noting that Hosea Stout, 
an early Utah attorney, served as counsel to a victorious party in a suit before a bishop’s court). 
 232. See Kirtland High Council Minutes, supra note 99. See also DOCTRINE & 
COVENANTS § 102:1–3, 5–6, 8–16, 22–30. 
 233. See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 283 (discussing the treatment of 
evidence in Mormon courts). 
 234. Young, supra note 187, at 239. 
 235. See, e.g., FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 9 (“Confession of br. Ziba Peterson 
of his transgression which was satisfactory to the Church as approved by unanimous vote.”). 
 236. Diary of Wilford Woodruff (May 27, 1843), in WAITING FOR WORLD’S END: THE 
DIARIES OF WILFORD WOODRUFF 58–59 (Susan Staker, ed., 1993). Woodruff’s language here 
tracks Mormon scripture’s understanding of Jesus Christ’s death as a reconciliation of both 
divine justice of sin and divine mercy toward the sinner: 
[T]hat great and last sacrifice will be the Son of God, yea, infinite and eternal.  
And thus he shall bring salvation to all those who shall believe on his name; this 
being the intent of this last sacrifice, to bring about the bowels of mercy, which 
overpowereth justice, and bringeth about means unto men that they may have faith 
unto repentance. And thus mercy can satisfy the demands of justice, and encircles 
them in the arms of safety, while he that exercises no faith unto repentance is 
exposed to the whole law of the demands of justice . . . . 
Alma 34:14–16 in THE BOOK OF MORMON (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
1981) (1830). 
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as the minutes of one early meeting put it, was for “[a]ll differences 
[to be] settled [and] hearts of all [to be] run together in love.”237 
In nineteenth-century Mormon culture, the displacing of the 
civic spectacle of litigation with religious spectacle shows up in other 
ways. In many county seats in nineteenth-century America, the 
central public building around which the community was physically 
organized was the court house.238 The physical location of the 
building reinforced the ritual primacy of adjudication of civic life. 
Indeed, in some towns the courthouse was the only public building, 
and religious services were held there.239 In contrast, when the 
Mormons laid out their settlements in the Great Basin, they sought 
to impose a very different symbolic order on their civic landscape.240 
The central public building was not the courthouse, but rather the 
stake “tabernacle.” All roads in a town, for example, were numbered 
in relation to this religious building, which served as both meeting 
hall and administrative headquarters for the stake presidency and 
High Council.241 The link to religious adjudication was not left 
implicit. For example, when the Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, in 
many ways the symbolic template for literally hundreds of Mormon 
villages, was dedicated in 1875, the prayer pled: 
Bless the High Council of this and other stakes of Zion, may they 
be full of the spirit of wisdom, justice and judgment, and, under 
the inspiration of the Most High, be quick to discern the right, 
 
 237. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 45. 
 238. For example, one author described the villages of ante-bellum Illinois from which 
the Mormons emigrated in 1846: “The settlement almost invariably clustered around a public 
square of generous dimensions, in the center of which stood the court-house, a substantial 
building of brick or stone.” FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 171 (1906). 
 239. See LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 317 (“Because many of these rural communities 
were devoid of a public place of worship, citizens gathered in the courthouse for divine 
services.”) John Phillip Reid, The Layers of Western Legal History, in LAW IN THE WESTERN 
UNITED STATES 7 (Gordon Morris Bakken ed., 2000) (“As Americans moved westward down 
the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers, and from the Georgia backcountry across the Mississippi, 
many of their important centers for commercial, social, and economic life grew up around 
courthouses. The courthouse square was often the center of town or county, stores and trade 
shops located about it, and often the better residences were in the vicinity.”). 
 240. See generally C. MARK HAMILTON, NINETEENTH-CENTURY MORMON 
ARCHITECTURE AND CITY PLANNING (1995) (discussing Mormon town planning and 
architecture in the nineteenth century); Martha Sonntag Bradley, Creating the Sacred Space of 
Zion, J. MORMON HIST., 1 (Summer 2005) (same); Richard H. Jackson, Sacred Space and City 
Planning: The Mormon Example, 9 ARCHITECTURE & BEHAV. 251 (1993) (same). 
 241. See HAMILTON, supra note 240, at 53–75 (discussing the role of tabernacles in 
Mormon towns in the nineteenth century). 
OMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 6:00 PM 
157] Preaching to the Court House and Judging in the Temple 
 201 
wise to admonish the wrong doer, free from all bias; and with 
integrity, truth, lowliness, patience, and fidelity, administer 
impartial justice to all.242 
Moreover, while some attacked the actual outcomes in church 
court cases,243 criticism of the system tended to emphasize the 
symbolic affront of displacing the secular law rather than the actual 
workings of the Mormon judiciary. For example, in April, 1838, 
Seymour Brunson filed a complaint against Oliver Cowdery, one of 
Joseph Smith’s closest early associates and a leading elder of the 
Church, charging him with a long list of spiritual and civil lapses, 
including “dishonestly [r]etaining notes after they had been paid.”244 
Cowdery responded with a lengthy letter to the High Council in 
which he denied their jurisdiction, invoking secular myths of noble 
Anglo-Saxon legality and the symbolic power of the constitution. 
“My venerable ancestor was among that little band, who landed on 
the rocks of Plymouth in 1620,” he wrote.245 “[W]ith him he 
brought those maxims, and a body of those laws which were the 
result and experience of many centuries, on the basis of which now 
stands our great and happy Government.”246 He went on, “This 
attempt to control me in my temporal interests, I conceive to be a 
disposition to take from me a portion of my Constitutional privileges 
and inherent rights.”247 A short time later Lyman Johnson, another 
high-ranking elder, refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the High 
Council in a case involving a civil lawsuit, responding with similar 
imagery. “I should not condescend,” he wrote, “to put my 
constitutional rights at issue upon so disrespectful a point.”248 The 
rhetoric testifies to the way that the Mormon courts displaced the 
 
 242. John Taylor, Dedicatory Prayer for the Salt Lake Tabernacle (October 9, 1875), in 
JOURNAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH, Church Archives, The Family and Church History 
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City Utah. 
 243. For example, the Salt Lake Tribune claimed that church courts were a means by 
which a church member could “use his power in the church to oppress and rob a brother 
member.” Church Robbery, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 1, 1891, at 4. More sinisterly, it insisted 
that even when the church excommunicated a member for serious misconduct (in this case 
incest) “the secret priestly court, as they always do, kept the crime a secret.” A Sorry Defense, 
SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 1890, at 4. 
 244. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 163. 
 245. Id. at 165. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 173. 
OMAN.PP3 2/13/2009 6:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2009 
202 
secular symbols and rituals of litigation with a distinctively religious 
set of symbols and rituals. 
III. “LAWYERS OF THEIR OWN” AND THE DECLINE OF THE 
MORMON COURTS 
After seventy years or more of practice, the Mormons ultimately 
abandoned the resolution of civil disputes in ecclesiastical courts, 
reserving church tribunals for more traditional questions of church 
discipline. The end of the expansive jurisdiction of the church courts 
was a ragged affair that involved both an official retreat from certain 
classes of disputes by church leaders and a gradual abandonment of 
the church courts by rank-and-file members. Ultimately, a variety of 
causes account for the shift. First, Mormon attitudes toward lawyers 
and litigation changed as a result of both attempts by Mormon 
lawyers to craft legitimating religious narratives for their work and 
dramatic changes in the nature of the legal profession itself. Second, 
as Mormon country integrated into the national economy in the late 
nineteenth-century, ecclesiastical courts increasingly faced disputes 
that they had neither the technical expertise nor the remedial 
machinery to handle effectively. Both of these causes, in turn, were 
part of the accommodation of Mormonism to American culture at 
the end of the nineteenth-century. This process involved the 
abandonment of distinctive Mormon practices—most notably 
polygamy—and an implicit agreement that Mormonism would 
henceforth conduct itself more in the manner of a Protestant sect 
rather than a theocratic kingdom.249 Previous historians have noted 
that Mormonism was forced to accommodate itself to a Protestant 
view of the constitution.250 The end of the civil jurisdiction of church 
courts marked a similar accommodation to a late nineteenth-century 
Protestantism that insisted on the separation of the private law from 
religious and (non-Anglo-Saxon) ethic allegiances. In short, part of 
becoming fully American meant fully embracing the secular common 
law. 
 
 249. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER, MORMONISM IN TRANSITION: A HISTORY OF 
THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1890–1930 (1996) (discussing the accommodation of Mormonism 
to norms of Protestant American society at the turn of the twentieth-century). 
 250. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 22, at 82 (“Reformers [hostile to Mormon 
polygamy] were committed to the release of fetters of human progress, to the onward march of 
civilization through the purification of marriage to protect and promote freedom, democracy, 
and equality—all in a constitutional system that integrated Christianity and political liberty.”).  
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From the beginning, Mormon attorneys sought to create an 
ecclesiastical identity for themselves other than that of lying tricksters 
bent on stirring up litigation. For example, in 1850 one Mormon 
lawyer noted in his diary that his client’s case was resolved by an 
“Elders meeting,” a method that he praised for “sav[ing] the time, 
expense & hard feelings of a long and tedious lawsuit” and which he 
commended to the assembled people.251 Brigham Young eventually 
came to adopt this self-conception of Mormon attorneys as working 
in the spirit of the church courts. Despite his hell-fire and damnation 
sermons against lawyers in the 1850s, his opposition to attorneys was 
never absolute. As early as 1852, for example, he said, after 
acknowledging the law as an educational pursuit, “[w]e want every 
branch of science taught in this place that is taught in the world.”252 
An 1872 sermon shows a further softening. While insisting that he 
did not “want any lawyers in our society,” he went on to say: 
There are many lawyers who are very excellent men. What is the 
advice of an honorable gentleman in the profession of the law? “Do 
not go to law with your neighbor. . . .” Why not . . . say we will 
arbitrate this case, and we will have no lawsuit, and no difficulty 
with our neighbor, to alienate our feelings one with another? This 
is the way we should do as a community.253 
From the amoral tricksters of his earlier sermons, Young’s 
thinking developed to a point in which he envisioned wise and 
learned men who acted in the spirit of church-based reconciliation 
rather than court-based litigation.  
Young’s rapprochement with the legal profession went beyond 
mere rhetoric. In 1868, Young spoke with Franklin S. Richards, the 
son of a close associate, about Richards’ future plans. Richards 
replied that he was studying medicine. Young insisted that it would 
 
 251. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 370. The diary records: 
“President Young recommended this method & for brethren to try their difficulties first in the 
church and not go to law untill [sic] a man will not abide the decisions of the church tribunals. 
I also made a short address recommending the same measures.” Id. 
 252. Brigham Young, The Lord at the Head of His Kingdom—Self-Discipline—
Necessity of Cultivating a Knowledge of Science, and Particularly of Theology, Etc. (sermon 
delivered April 7, 1852), in 6 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 314, 317 (George D. Watts et al. eds., 
1856). It is possible that he was referring to a “Law School” established five months earlier by 
Mormon attorneys in Salt Lake City. See text accompanying infra notes 271–272. 
 253. Brigham Young, Discourse by President Brigham Young, Delivered at the 42nd 
Semi-Annual Conference, Salt Lake City (October 9, 1872), in 15 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 
220, 224–25 (George D. Watts et al. eds., 1856).  
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be better if Richards were to take up the study of law, “because the 
time will come when the Latter-day Saints will need lawyers of their 
own to defend them in the Courts and strive with fearless inspiration 
to maintain their constitutional rights.”254 Richards went on to 
become an attorney, eventually serving as general counsel to the 
church. An 1883 sketch of Richards presented him as the incarnation 
of Young’s later vision of learned lawyers embedded within the 
context of church courts. “As a churchman and High Councilor 
[Richards’] advice has uniformly been to litigants to settle their 
difficulties themselves or by arbitration, in the modes prescribed by 
Church discipline; that only such cases should go to the courts as 
could not be adjusted by these methods.”255 
As the nineteenth-century progressed, Mormons continued to 
treat the legal profession with suspicion, but they simultaneously 
sought to sanctify it by embedding Mormon lawyers in the narratives 
of priesthood authority and revelation that stood at the core of the 
church judiciary. Hence, one Latter-day Saint attorney recorded that 
in the early 1880s he and his law partner were rebuked from the 
pulpit by their local bishop for having “blossomed out as full-fledged 
lawyers.”256 At about the same time, the stake president of another 
young man who was considering law school told him, “You will go 
to Hell!” and urged him to consult with Brigham Young’s successor 
as president of the church, John Taylor.257 The young man met with 
Taylor, who attempted to dissuade him. When he was unconvinced, 
Taylor laid hands on his head and gave him a blessing that cautiously 
sanctified his legal education. “Brother Moyle, in the name of the 
Lord Jesus Christ, and by the virtue of the Holy Priesthood, we lay 
our hands upon thy head to seal upon thee a blessing,” Taylor 
began.258 He continued, “we say unto thee that [law] is a dangerous 
profession, one that leads many people down to destruction.”259 The 
 
 254. Ken Driggs, “Lawyers of Their Own to Defend Them”: The Legal Career of Franklin 
Snyder Richards, J. MORMON HIST. 84, 88 (Fall 1995). 
 255. Edward W. Tullidge, Franklin S. Richards, 2 TULLIDGE’S Q. MAG. 456, 466 
(1883). 
 256. John R. Alley, Jr., Utah State Supreme Court Justice Samuel R. Thurman, 61 UTAH 
H. Q. 233, 237 (1993). 
 257. MORMON DEMOCRAT: THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL MEMOIRS OF JAMES 
HENRY MOYLE 108–09 (Gene A. Sessions ed., 1998) [hereinafter MORMON DEMOCRAT]. 
 258. Id. at 109–10. 
 259. Id. at 110. 
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blessing, however, went on to affirm the young man’s choice. “[I]f 
thou wilt abstain from arguing falsely and on false principles 
maintaining only the things that can be honorably sustained by 
honorable men . . . the Lord God will bless thee in this calling . . . 
with wisdom and intelligence, and with the light of revelation.”260 
Using language normally reserved for men chosen as missionaries or 
for other church positions, the blessing concluded, “We set thee 
apart . . . to go forth as thou hast desired to study and become 
acquainted with all the principles of law and equity.”261 The trend 
continued when a decade later, Taylor’s successor, Wilford 
Woodruff, issued a “call” to one young school teacher to travel east 
to Cornell to study law.262 In doing so, he fused the study of law 
with the mechanism—a call from the prophet—through which 
earlier generations of Mormons had been sent forth to proclaim 
Joseph Smith’s message of restoration or to found distant 
settlements as part of establishing Zion in the Great Basin. 
Changing Mormon attitudes toward lawyers, not surprisingly, 
mirrored changes within the legal profession itself. Developments 
that occurred early in the metropolitan centers of the East often 
happened much later on the frontier inhabited by the Latter-day 
Saints. In the 1750s, incensed at “Pettyfoggers,” John Adams 
recommended that Suffolk County create a bar association.263 His 
complaints with what he regarded as the dishonest antics of lawyers 
bent on deceiving juries and taking advantage of clients might have 
been penned by Brigham Young a century later. Adams and his 
associates, however, responded to the failings that they perceived in 
the legal profession very differently. Their solution was to exclude 
irregular practitioners from the courts and increase the level of 
training required to become a licensed attorney,264 a process of 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 110–11. 
 262. Justin David Call: Biographical Notes (unpublished manuscript in the author’s 
possession) (“Father was called to be a missionary to New York and to study law at Cornell 
University. The call received was from the First Presidency of the L.D.S. Church and signed by 
President Wilford Woodruff, George Q. Cannon and Joseph F. Smith—Sept. 16, 1895.”).  
 263. See GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 1760–1840, at 13 (1979). 
 264. Id. at 131. 
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professionalization largely complete in Massachusetts by the third or 
fourth decade of the nineteenth century.265  
On the frontier, however, the professional standards were much 
laxer. In contrast to the increasingly well-educated professionals in 
the East, “[w]estern lawyers, as a rule, were the sons of poor or 
middle-class people and seldom had a college education.”266 Indeed, 
there was even a process of formal de-professionalization on the 
frontier. Prior to 1830, most state and territorial statutes required an 
apprenticeship of two to three years before a man could be admitted 
to the bar. A widespread movement abolished such requirements 
during the Jacksonian period, however, and the tendency on the 
frontier was “to allow a young man to practice law as soon as he 
could convince any judge that he knew ‘some law.’”267 
Initially, Utah Territory adopted this relaxed attitude toward the 
profession. An 1852 “Act for the Regulation of Attorneys” stated 
that “it shall be the duty of all Judges of courts in this Territory, to 
grant a hearing as counsel to any person of good moral character, 
chosen by any person or persons to prosecute or defend a case.”268 
Many otherwise untrained advocates took advantage of this law, 
relying on their rhetorical powers to sway the jury rather than any 
specialized legal knowledge. For example, one newly minted 
attorney defending a man who killed his wife’s lover, argued 
brazenly for jury nullification, insisting that the man’s actions were 
justified by the “mountain common law.”269 Indeed, even Brigham 
Young appeared as counsel in another 1851 case.270 Early Utah 
lawyers did attempt to raise the standards among members of the bar 
by founding a short-lived “law school” taught by the territory’s first 
chief justice “who tender[ed] his sirvis [sic] as a teacher gratis for the 
 
 265. Id. at 168 (“By 1840 the profession’s real power had reached a level that was almost 
immune to front attacks.”). 
 266. 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 
106 (1965). 
 267. Id. 
 268. An Act for the Regulation of Attorneys §1 in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. 
 269. See Kenneth L. Cannon II, “Mountain Common Law”: The Extralegal Punishment of 
Seducers in Early Utah, 51 UTAH HIST. Q. 309, 310–14 (1983). 
 270. Id. at 310. In this case, Young also represented a man accused of killing the seducer 
of his wife. The case was tried before the Territorial Supreme Court and Young’s opponent 
was the Mormon attorney Hosea Stout. The man was acquitted. 
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benefit of all those who wish to inter [sic] into the Study of Law.”271 
The “Law School,” however, does not seem to have survived beyond 
the winter of 1851–1852.272  
As conditions on the Mormon frontier became more settled, the 
leaders of the bar sought to recreate the closed and learned 
profession they imagined in the East by imposing additional 
requirements on the practice of law. By 1876, the Supreme Court of 
the Territory required “the favorable report of an examining 
Committee appointed for that purpose” before admitting a person to 
practice in “this Court . . . [and] in all Courts in this Territory.”273 
Perhaps most importantly, in 1869, the Union Pacific and Central 
Pacific Railroads met at Promontory Point, Utah. Retracing the steps 
of their parents in reverse, young men from Mormon country began 
riding the trains east to study in the law schools that, following the 
example of Langdell’s Harvard, were emerging as the gatekeepers of 
the legal profession.274 Those who returned west after studying at 
Michigan and other eastern schools felt that they had been socialized 
into an entirely different legal profession than the half-educated 
courtroom brawlers Young had denounced in the 1850s. “[O]ur 
people generally,” wrote one such Mormon lawyer, “were not 
familiar with the ethics and high ideals that college law students have 
instilled in them by their teachers and the leaders of the legal 
profession.”275 
The railroad also set in motion economic changes that would 
transform the nature of litigation. Brigham Young enthusiastically 
supported the coming of the railroad, which he saw as a means of 
hastening Latter-day Saint immigrants from overseas to the Mormon 
 
 271. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 410. Stout reports the content 
of instruction thus: “the Judge [Zararubbel Snow] gave us a short lecture on the nature and 
origin of government & law, after which it was agreed to establish the school.” Id. 
 272. Id. at 411–12 (recording meetings of the “Law School” during the winter of 1851–
52). 
 273. Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, Rule 21, 1 Utah 1, 7 (1876). 
 274. See, e.g., JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE 
STATE 15–21 (1951) (discussing George Sutherland’s move from Provo, Utah to Ann Arbor, 
Michigan to study law and his return to Utah to practice); MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 
257, at 107–08 (discussing Utahns who traveled east to study law prior to 1882); see also 
JONATHAN LURIE, LAW AND THE NATION: 1865–1912, at 43–54 (1983) (discussing Langdell 
and the rise of American law schools). 
 275. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 109. 
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Zion in the Great Basin.276 However, it also marked the beginning of 
the integration of Mormon country into the national economy, a 
trend that the Mormons initially fought with a renewed emphasis on 
home manufactures, cooperative economic endeavors, and a boycott 
of Gentile merchants.277 In the end, however, these efforts could not 
succeed against the massive forces of economic integration in the 
wake of the Civil War.  
Not surprisingly, these forces changed the nature of litigation 
among Latter-day Saints, presenting problems that the church courts 
were ultimately ill-equipped to handle. The economic depression 
that swept the nation in 1893 provides an illustration. Beginning 
with panics in the distant financial centers of London and New York, 
the depression spread rapidly through the nation’s increasingly 
integrated economy, throwing thousands out of work and drying up 
credit for troubled enterprises.278 Mormon businessmen in Utah 
found themselves scrambling to secure payment of debts in a falling 
market that was pushing many into bankruptcy. The natural move in 
such a situation would be for the creditor to obtain a lien on a 
debtor’s property as rapidly as possible so as to secure repayment 
regardless of how the debtor’s assets were distributed. The church 
courts, however, could only apply personal pressure to litigants 
before them. They lacked the ability to provide the kind of in rem 
remedies needed in the context of a race for the courthouse. The 
result was a Hobson’s choice for many Mormon businessmen, who 
found themselves at a ruinous disadvantage vis-à-vis Gentiles who 
could pursue actions without impediment in the civil courts.279 These 
forces ultimately pushed Mormons to abandon the church courts. 
One Mormon lawyer later explained: 
For a good illustration, my bishop, an exceptionally splendid man, 
was in the mercantile business in Salt Lake City. All ward bishops 
presided over a bishop’s court. But he came to me and said, “I have 
never sued a brother. And it greatly disturbs me to do so, but I 
 
 276. See ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM, supra note 84, at 236. 
 277. Id. at 240. 
 278. See generally CHARLES HOFFMAN, THE DEPRESSION OF THE NINETIES: AN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY (1970) (discussing the panic of 1893 and the resulting global economic 
depression). For a discussion of the effect of the Panic on business in Mormon country and the 
state of church finances, see RONALD W. WALKER, QUALITIES THAT COUNT: HEBER J. GRANT 
AS BUSINESSMAN, MISSIONARY, AND APOSTLE 115–42 (2004). 
 279. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 10–11. 
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must or go into bankruptcy and let the property of my debtors be 
taken by strangers who have recently come among us.” The 
conclusion was inevitable, and suits at law rapidly became 
common.280 
Other forces were at work as well. After the Civil War, the first 
truly national capital markets emerged, and with them the 
corporation became the dominant form of business organization. In 
1870, the territorial legislature adopted a general incorporation 
statute that allowed any group of people who were “desirous of 
associating themselves together for establishing and conducting any 
mining, manufacturing, commercial or other industrial pursuit in this 
Territory” to create a corporation.281 While church courts initially 
did not hesitate to take jurisdiction over disputes involving Mormon-
dominated corporations (particularly corporations that were part of 
communal Mormon economic efforts), church leaders eventually 
decided to disclaim jurisdiction over corporations.282 The separation 
of ownership and control inherent in the corporate form necessarily 
created legal duties on the part of directors and officers. Did a 
Mormon corporate officer with a fiduciary duty to bring suit on 
behalf of a corporation violate his religious duties if the corporation 
sued another Mormon?283  
Ironically, the First Presidency found itself in the position of 
seeking legal advice from its general counsel on the fiduciary duties 
of members in order to resolve cases appealed to it, injecting lawyers 
into the very apex of a system designed to exclude them from 
 
 280. Id. at 11. 
 281. An Act Providing for Incorporating Associations, for Mining, Manufacturing, 
Commercial and Other Industrial Pursuits § 1, in ACTS, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS, 
PASSED AND ADOPTED DURING THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH (1870). 
 282. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 110. 
 283. James Henry Moyle, a Mormon attorney active in Utah from the 1880s on, records 
one such case: 
It was in the early 1890s that I was put on trial in the Twelfth Ward before the 
bishop with all of the leading officers of a corporation for suing a brother in court. 
It was my only offense in a Church court but in this case I was only the attorney. 
The case was promptly dismissed when the corporate offense of the defendants 
became apparent, which it very soon did. 
MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 137. 
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adjudication.284 Church leaders ultimately decided that rather than 
wading into these difficulties, church courts should simply avoid 
resolving such disputes. “In applying [the rule that Mormons should 
resolve their disputes in church courts],” wrote The Deseret Evening 
News, “corporations whose stock holders may be Church members 
are not included, and have no standing in Church courts, which are 
for the benefit and discipline of members individually.”285 
Another force at work was the growth of the legal profession. In 
the late nineteenth century the number of lawyers in America 
skyrocketed. For example, in 1880 there were roughly 64,000 
lawyers in the country, but thirty years later the number had nearly 
doubled to 122,000.286 The expansion of the legal profession in the 
West, however, was even more rapid. Nationally, there was roughly 
one lawyer per thousand in 1850. By 1890 that number had risen to 
nearly 1.5 lawyers per thousand.287 In the West, however, there were 
less than 0.5 lawyers per thousand in 1850, while by 1890 the region 
was well ahead of the national average with over 2.5 lawyers per 
thousand.288 The explosion of the profession in the West was largely 
the result of legal uncertainty created by Congress. In the years after 
the Civil War, Congress passed a series of laws designed to 
encourage farming, ranching, mining, and railroading in the Far 
 
 284. For example, in an 1896 case, the First Presidency was faced with a church suit 
against a woman who had sued another Mormon on behalf of an estate for which she was the 
administratrix. The secretary to the First Presidency wrote to the stake president in the case: 
Brother Richards [Franklin S. Richards, general counsel to the church] is of the 
opinion that the court will not permit her to waive any of her legal rights in this 
matter, and that she should be free to wind up the estate as the law directs. The first 
presidency see this matter in the light in which Brother Richards presents it, and 
they request that you write the parties (Sister Bouton and the Brothers Harris) to 
this effect, which will leave Sister Bouton free to act in this matter as she may be 
legally advised; and this will leave her in the position as though no arbitration 
proceedings had been taken. 
Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 3:16 (reproducing a letter from George F. Gibbs to 
President E.D. Wooley). 
 285. Lawsuits Between Church Members, DESERT EVENING NEWS, Feb. 1, 1896, at 1. 
 286. LURIE, supra note 274, at 43. 
 287. See Kelly Paulson, Lawyers and the American West: An Empirical Investigation into 
the Components of Demand for Legal Services from 1850 to 1930, at 8 graph 1 (2005) 
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, Stanford University), available at http://www-
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 288. Id. at 9 graph 2. 
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West. They did this by granting huge amounts of federally owned 
land to those willing to develop it. The result was a legal bonanza, as 
those involved in the land grabs litigated over title to property and 
the meaning of complex and newly minted federal statutes.289 These 
economic forces, however, changed the nature of civil litigation. No 
longer was it a generally accessible ritual in which lawyers tried to 
sway juries with their rhetorical skills, while the local crowd looked 
on. Rather, litigation in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s became a 
specialized affair involving increasingly well-trained attorneys arguing 
over the implications of arcane federal statutes. The public spectacle 
of litigation that had so concerned Brigham Young in the 1850s and 
1860s was largely dead a generation later. 
Litigation over the ownership of land illustrates the complexity 
of the legal environment as the nineteenth century progressed. When 
the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin in the summer of 1847, the 
region was still nominally Mexican territory, part of the province of 
Upper California. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the 
entire region transferred to the United States.290 Neither Mexican 
nor American authorities, however, granted formal title to the 
Mormons, who were, legally speaking, squatters. Rather, the church 
allocated land first on a communal basis and then to individual 
settlers.291 The uncertain legal status of these ecclesiastical land grants 
led to contradictory Mormon attitudes toward federal land law. On 
one hand, they repeatedly petitioned Congress for a territorial land 
office to regularize title to their land. At the same time, they feared 
 
 289. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (arguing that litigation and the demand 
for lawyers is driven by legal uncertainty). Kelly Paulson provides empirical support for this 
conclusion by running regression analysis of the number of lawyers against indicia of railroad 
and mining activity. He concludes, “given the lingering significance of the Western dummy in 
1860, 1870, 1890, and 1900, it seems that the railroad and mining variables, while explaining 
most of the Western effect, do not account for all of it.” Paulson, supra note 287, at 25. 
Paulson’s conclusion is also supported by a qualitative analysis of the (very limited) surviving 
Utah Territorial Court records for civil cases, the vast bulk of which are from after the Civil 
War and involve litigation over property rights conferred under federal statutes. 
 290. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, U.S.–Mexico, art. V, Feb. 
2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (setting forth the new border between the United States and Mexico, 
ceding all of the Great Basin to the United States). 
 291. See Lawrence L. Linford, Establishing and Maintaining Land Ownership in Utah 
Prior to 1869; 42 UTAH HIST. Q. 126, 127–28 (1974) (tracing the history of land ownership 
in early Utah); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1342–44 
(1993) (providing an economic theory of why Mormons shifted from communal to private 
ownership of land in early Utah).  
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that new settlers would take advantage of federal legislation to 
appropriate communally or privately held Mormon lands. Nor were 
their fears entirely unfounded, as federal officials regarded land policy 
as a tool for diluting Mormon power in Utah Territory. “There can 
be no doubt,” wrote the federal Surveyor General of Colorado and 
Utah in 1864, “that the true policy of the government in regard to 
Utah is to encourage the emigration to that Territory of a 
population less hostile to the United States than the present.”292 He 
went on to write, “[t]o do this, Gentile emigration must have the 
chance of acquiring title to the land, and must be protected in that 
title.”293  
The result in Utah was sporadic hostility toward federal surveyors 
in the 1850s, violence toward Gentile claim jumpers in the 1860s, 
and gradual regularization of title to land beginning in 1870.294 
Throughout Mormon country, however, the title of Mormon settlers 
to land remained uncertain. Virtually all of the settlements began as 
church-sponsored “missions” directed by the Mormon hierarchy in 
Salt Lake City, and most Mormon settlers acquired land initially via 
an ecclesiastical grant. The situation was further complicated in the 
decades after the Civil War as Congress passed a slew of statutes 
multiplying the methods by which ownership of public land could be 
moved into private hands.  
The case of Birdsall v. Leavitt illustrates these problems.295 The 
Birdsall family moved from Nebraska to Utah in 1881, eventually 
settling in Sevier County, located in the central part of the 
Territory.296 Three years later, the family converted to Mormonism. 
Members of the Birdsall family began trying to acquire land under 
various federal statutes. They purchased land from the Rio Grande 
railroad, which had been given huge tracts by Congress as a 
subsidy.297 They also claimed land under the Timber Culture Act, 
which granted “ten acres of timber on any quarter section” of public 
 
 292. Linford, supra note 291, at 137. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 134–43. 
 295. See generally Ardis E. Parshall, “Church Hounds Woman to Madness”: The Trials of 
Cora Birdsall, unpublished paper presented at the August, 2002, Sunstone Symposium, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
 296. See Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 2:321 (testimony of Isaac Birdsall). 
 297. See Deed, Sevier County, Utah, Book 28 Entry 5289 (11 June 1904) (Birdsall deed 
to the disputed land). 
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land to any person “who shall plant, protect, and keep in a healthy, 
growing condition for eight years.”298 The land the Birdsalls claimed, 
however, had long before been claimed by an earlier settler, who had 
sold the property to a James Leavitt in 1883.299 Leavitt, who had 
“owned” the land for a decade in 1893 when the Birdsalls first 
claimed it, insisted later that they agreed to sell to him the portion 
he occupied, thus quieting title.300 The Panic of 1893, however, kept 
Leavitt from obtaining financing, although he apparently gave the 
Birdsalls some cows in partial payment.301 In doing so, Leavitt seems 
to have been trying to follow the established Mormon policy for 
dealing with title conflicts between older settlers and claims based on 
federal statutes. As the First Presidency explained in a 1903 letter to 
one bishop: 
With President Young we hold that when any person secures title 
from the Government to land, part of which has been occupied and 
cultivated by others, he or she should respect the rights of such 
persons by being willing to deed to them the land they have 
improved, provided that they pay their share of the expenses 
incurred in securing the Government title, and also a fair 
remuneration to the pre-emptor or homesteader for the loss of his 
or her preemption or homestead right in proportion to the amount 
of land to which they are benefited.302 
Without successfully finalizing his claim to the land, Isaac 
Birdsall conveyed it to his daughter Cora, who eventually gained title 
under the Timber Culture Act.303 Leavitt continued to press his 
 
 298. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Encourage the Growth of Timber on 
the Western Prairies” §1, 20 Stat. 113 (1878). See also Minutes of a Special Session of the 
High Council of Sevier Stake of Zion Held at the Tabernacle, Richfield, Utah, Tabernacle 
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Presidency to Bishop O.B. Andersen). 
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claims based on the rights of the earlier settler as well as the 1893 
agreement with Birdsall. In 1901, he “prefer[red] a charge of 
unchristianlike conduct against Isaac Birdsall and Sister Cora 
Birdsall” before their bishop.304 All parties appeared and presented 
evidence. The bishop issued a decision “[t]hat Cora Birdsall shall 
deed unto James E. Leavitt [the disputed land].”305 Cora wrote the 
First Presidency asking for permission to proceed at law, and received 
a letter instructing her to appeal to the Sevier Stake High Council if 
she was dissatisfied with the bishop’s decision.306 She did so, the case 
was retried, and the High Council affirmed the decision of the 
bishop’s court.307 The High Council seemed to regard the Birdsalls’ 
actions as an underhanded attempt to use the federal statutes to rob 
Leavitt of his property. “If you were placed in Leavitt’s place and 
paid for the land and possessed it,” one of the High Councilors 
asked Cora during the trial, “would you feel right if you were treated 
as he is?”308 Cora appealed to the First Presidency, and in 1903 
received a letter affirming the High Council’s decision.309 She 
refused to deed the land to Leavitt and was subsequently 
excommunicated.310 
At this point, the litigation took an unexpected turn. After her 
excommunication, Cora began acting increasingly distraught and 
erratic. In February, 1904 a doctor from the state mental hospital 
adjudged her insane, insisting that she suffered from hereditary 
madness. In June, 1904, Cora was visited by local priesthood leaders 
who gave her a blessing and insisted that she could be rebaptized if 
she would comply with the decision of the church courts and deed 
the disputed land to Leavitt. She did so and was rebaptized, but her 
mental condition continued to deteriorate.311 By this time, Utah had 
chosen Mormon apostle Reed Smoot to become its new U.S. 
Senator, sparking a national drive to unseat him, a movement Cora’s 
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father was willing to support. The Senate Committee on Privileges 
and Elections launched a massive investigation of the economic, 
legal, and political affairs of the Mormon church,312 and in 
December, 1904, Isaac Birdsall traveled east to testify before the 
Senators. For a brief moment, the case became national news, 
providing evidence of Mormon dominance in Utah.313  
The case did not stop with the newspapers. Upon his return to 
Utah, Isaac Birdsall, acting as guardian for his daughter, sued Leavitt 
for the disputed land, arguing that the deed Cora had executed was 
invalid. The district court rejected his claim that she was mentally 
incompetent and that the elders who “labored” with her to comply 
with the church court’s decision exercised undue influence, writing: 
All churches . . . have a right to discipline their members and . . . 
they have a right to handle such person so far as their fellowship in 
such . . . church is concerned. The members, however, are under 
no legal obligations to obey such regulation or decision of their . . . 
church . . . .314 
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, however, Birdsall 
prevailed.315 The Court held that “[Cora], at the time she executed 
the deed, was mentally incapacitated and therefore incompetent to 
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make the same.”316 The justices went on to signal their concerns with 
the church courts: “While courts do not interfere in disputes 
between churches and their members in respect to church or spiritual 
affairs, the property rights of the members will be protected as 
readily from church interference as from any other.”317 
The perennially pugnacious Salt Lake Tribune, always anxious to 
attack the Mormon majority, hailed the court’s decision with glee. 
“The opinion of the Supreme Court,” wrote the paper, “is a stinging 
castigation of the methods brought to bear by the Mormon elders. It 
is a ringing denunciation of the methods of the ‘church  
courts . . . .’”318 Elsewhere, the Tribune insisted that “[t]he decision 
made by the Supreme Court . . . will excite the admiration and win 
the support of all mankind.” As for the church courts,  
[t]he attention of the civilized world is called anew to the horrors 
of the hierarchical rule in Utah. . . . [This case] illustrates perfectly 
the treasonable autocracy with which the hierarchs dominate over 
the civil government; it demonstrates their intention to maintain 
themselves as superior to earthly law . . . .319 
All of these developments took place against a background of 
decades of legal hostility to Mormon institutions and practices. The 
most dramatic manifestation of this hostility, of course, was the 
massive federal legal crusade against polygamy, but the Mormon 
antipathy toward the common law did not go unnoticed. Rather 
than seeing Mormon practice as the afterlife of a Protestant tradition 
of civil dispute resolution in church courts, Mormonism’s mainly 
Protestant critics in the last half of the nineteenth century saw it as 
further evidence of Mormonism’s sinister and un-American power in 
Utah. For example, Robert N. Baskin, the chief legal strategist 
against the Mormon Church in Utah in the nineteenth century, 
strikingly begins his memoirs of conflict with the Mormons by 
noting their hostility to the common law: 
All the states except Louisiana, and territories except Utah, had by 
statute adopted the common law so far as applicable to the new 
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conditions. That law was and is indispensably necessary for the 
proper government of any American community. It was, therefore, 
the imperative duty of the Utah legislature to adopt it at the first 
territorial session. Instead of doing so the foregoing absurd section 
of the judiciary act excluding it was passed.320 
Note the way in which Baskin identified the common law with 
the “American community,” marking Mormon antipathy toward 
that law as evidence of their status as un-American outsiders. As 
Gentiles penetrated Utah, the church courts became one of the flash 
points in the increasingly bitter battles between Mormons and non-
Mormons for political, economic, and social power in Utah.321 For 
example, the first “Gentile” newspaper in Utah—The Valley Tan, 
named for a locally brewed whiskey of the same name—claimed that 
Brigham Young’s denunciations of lawyers were part of a plot to 
“throw obloquy upon the character of law courts and drive the 
people into their ecclesiastical courts, for the adjustment of all 
grievances.”322 The ultimate goal was “suppressing the Judiciary, and 
depriving men of their Constitutional rights of trial, by due process of 
law . . . .”323 Likewise, in the eyes of the anti-Mormon Salt Lake 
Tribune, Mormons who refused to comply with the edicts of church 
courts were praised for preserving their “manhood,” while those 
who accepted ecclesiastical decisions, the Tribune insisted, “are not 
men who are fit to exercise the more sacred rights of American 
citizenship.”324  
The rhetoric surrounding the Birdsall case powerfully illustrates 
the way in which allegiance to the secular courts became a condition 
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for full entry into the American community. The Washington Post 
reported that the bishop’s court had deprived Cora of “property to 
which she held the lawful title,”325 while the Washington Times noted 
that “[p]robably there is not another organization in the United 
States with the gall to set itself up as a judicial authority and apply its 
own code, regardless of statutory law.”326 The Times went on to 
compare the Mormons to the “Chinese highbinders of San 
Francisco,” writing: 
[The Chinese] are reckoned to be living in heathen darkness. They 
scorn utterly the duly constituted courts, even in relation to such 
serious acts as murder. However, there is not involved in their 
demeanor any threat to society. They are aliens, in no manner 
concerned with the affairs of the land. They . . . could no more 
appreciate what we think is civilization than they could fly. They do 
not think in terms that can be grasped by any but the Oriental 
mind.327 
The racial status of the Mormons, however, made their courts much 
more threatening. “The Mormon is in our midst . . . .” the paper 
wrote. “His defiance is brazen, deliberate, and the climax of 
arrogance.”328 The editorial closed darkly, “If any banded bigots can 
rise superior to the United States, it is interesting to watch them rise, 
and speculate as to the character of the meat on which they feed.”329 
In short, the hostility of Mormons to the common law was evidence 
that they—like the Chinese—were dangerous outsiders.  
In an era when the Mormon Church was aggressively seeking the 
shelter of respectability after decades of intense hostility, it is not 
surprising that church leaders had actually been trying to disentangle 
the church courts from disputes over land for some time by 1900. In 
1896, the Deseret News published an article instructing that “in cases 
involving title to lands . . . the Church courts could not consider 
them if requested to do so, as the Church discipline is such that it 
will not attempt the adjustment of any controversy where there 
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might be a possibility of conflict with the laws of the land.”330 
Likewise, during the 1890s, the First Presidency sent a number of 
letters instructing lower church courts not to try cases “when matters 
relating to the boundary of lands and kindred subjects are in 
dispute.”331 The First Presidency’s pronouncements, however, were 
ambivalent. Another, 1896 letter reads: 
We can not, as a church, put ourselves in the position of using our 
church courts to enforce the laws or to set aside the laws or the 
decisions of the courts. With a little reflection you can readily see 
that this would be dangerous. But if men who are members of the 
church act unjustly and trespass upon their neighbor’s rights by the 
misuse of the law or by taking advantage we can deal with them.332 
Church leaders wished both to avoid the perception of hostility 
to the common law, but also desired to discipline members for 
conduct that, while technically legal, violated religious standards. 
Elsewhere, the First Presidency seemed to draw the jurisdictional line 
for church courts between in personam complaints against individuals 
and in rem attempts to settle title to land.333 Not surprisingly, the 
precise limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in cases like Birdsall v. 
Leavitt, which involved claims based on both the title of earlier 
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general thing, the lines of a quarter section would run through the lands of more 
than one settler; and in order that every man might have title to that which 
belonged to him, one of the interested parties would comply with the provisions of 
the law and obtain title, and after doing this he would deed to others such portions 
of the homestead entry as belonged to them; and it was not an uncommon thing for 
our church courts to settle disputes arising under those circumstances. But since the 
Government survey it has not been customary for church courts to entertain 
complaints involving the title to lands, and the same may be said with respect to 
water. All disputes involving legal titles must be adjudicated by courts of competent 
jurisdiction. The point we wish to make clear is this, that church courts must not 
undertake to deprive any of its members of their legal rights. 
Id. at 18. The letter, however, went on to insist that members had an obligation to 
accommodate the claims of earlier settlers whose rights conflicted with government surveys. Id. 
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settlers and personal contracts, was unclear.334 The resulting 
confusion, however, exposed the church to widespread charges of 
duplicity, as church leaders had claimed during the Smoot hearings 
that church courts did not adjudicate cases involving land.  
In the years after the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Birdsall 
v. Leavitt, high church leaders resolved to further limit the 
jurisdiction of church courts. In October, 1908, a committee of 
apostles authored a report to the First Presidency suggesting that 
church courts “be not used as agencies for the collection of ordinary 
debts.”335 The report went on to suggest that “Church Courts shall 
not be used to enforce compliance with [the] moral obligation” to 
pay debts discharged in bankruptcy or otherwise unenforceable at 
law.336 The report, however, reveals the same ambivalent attitude 
seen in the First Presidency letters on land disputes a decade earlier. 
The church was unwilling to say that questions of church discipline 
were disposed of by resolving questions of legality. Hence, the report 
stated: 
[B]ut if a member of the church shall unjustly, and in an 
unchristianlike manner, bring his brother before the civil courts, or 
if there be an element of fraud or dishonesty on the part of a 
member who owes a debt, which he refused to pay, either would 
be liable to trial for his fellowship in the church by the Bishops 
Court or High Council.337 
Likewise, while church courts were not to be used to enforce debts 
discharged by bankruptcy, “every consistent effort should be made 
 
 334. The Birdsall case was probably further complicated by the fact that in 1896, just five 
years before Leavitt preferred charges to Cora’s bishop, the First Presidency had sent a letter to 
the Sevier Stake President specifically encouraging him to promote the arbitration of title 
disputes among his flock. Id. at 17 (reproducing a letter from the First Presidency to President 
W.H. Seegmiller stating that they “heartily approve” arbitration of a dispute over title to “22 
acres of school land”). In context, the First Presidency seems to have endorsed arbitration as a 
process separate from church courts whereby “[t]here is a method which can be adopted under 
the law by which the decision of arbitrators can be entered on the court records and made 
legal.” Id. It is possible, however, that when the Birdsall case came before his High Council, 
President Seegmiller did not make a distinction between arbitration and church courts, taking 
the previous letter as permission for church courts to hear land disputes. In any case, none of 
the First Presidency correspondence in the Birdsall case suggests that they regarded the dispute 
as being improper for church courts.  
 335. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 343 (quoting the report). 
 336. Id. at 343–44 (quoting the report). 
 337. Id. at 343. 
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to persuade [debtors financially able to pay discharged debts] to 
settle with their former creditors.”338 
The reality, however, was that the Mormon judiciary was already 
in decline by 1908. Indeed, in urban areas Mormons seemed to have 
largely abandoned the church courts for civil disputes by the turn of 
the century. In 1904, Mormon attorney James Henry Moyle was 
called to the High Council of the newly organized Ensign Stake in 
Salt Lake City, where he continued to serve for more than twenty 
years. During that time, the High Council did not consider a single 
civil dispute. “So ended,” he wrote, “a salient feature of pioneer 
times when pretty much all were of one faith.”339 Ecclesiastical 
disputes in outlying settlements where the legal culture was simpler 
continued for longer, as illustrated by the Birdsall case. As late as 
1919, an article in the church-published Improvement Era stated 
that: 
We hold that in matters of difference between brethren, in which 
no specific infraction of the secular law is involved, and in offenses 
called “civil” as distinguished from “criminal”, it is truly unworthy 
of members of the Church today as it was in Paul’s time that 
“brother goeth to law with brother” and that it stands to our 
shame if righteous judgment cannot be rendered among 
ourselves.340 
Despite this plea, however, Mormons continued to take their 
civil disputes to the secular courts. The forces of a modernizing 
economy, the quest of Mormon lawyers for religious legitimacy 
within their community, and not least the importance of allegiance 
to the common law as a condition for Mormon entry into the 
American community had combined to end the judging of civil cases 
within the temple of the church. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The inheritors of a strong Protestant tradition of church 
discipline, early Mormons took it for granted that adjudication was a 
central religious practice, and as Joseph Smith developed his 
 
 338. Id. at 344. 
 339. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 136. 
 340. James E. Talmage, Judiciary System of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
IMPROVEMENT ERA, April, 1919 at 498, 499 reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL JAMES E. TALMAGE 
198, 200 (James P. Harris ed., 1997). 
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increasingly radical theology in the 1830s and 1840s he found ways 
of embedding the emerging Mormon judiciary within its narratives. 
This Article began with two contrasting stories: one about Mormon 
elders preaching to a court-day crowd, and the other about Mormon 
elders adjudicating a civil dispute in their Temple. The arc 
connecting these events illustrates the relationship between religion 
and litigation for nineteenth-century Latter-day Saints. The 
Mormons wished to preach to the court house, denouncing its 
divisiveness, chicanery, and corrosive moral spectacle. At the same 
time, they wished to domesticate civil disputes, forcing litigious 
church members to embed their arguments within the theological 
narratives and institutional settings of the church. Suing before the 
ungodly was to be replaced by lawsuits in the Temple. 
In a world where most disputes were relatively simple and could 
be resolved without specialized legal knowledge, such a system was 
tenable. Indeed, given the frequent legal illiteracy of frontier judges, 
church courts were not necessarily even at a comparative 
disadvantage vis-à-vis secular courts with regard to legal knowledge. 
With the economic integration that came in the wake of the Civil 
War and more importantly the completion of the transcontinental 
railroad in 1869, the disputes church courts were called upon to 
resolve became increasingly complicated. In addition, the nature of 
civil litigation itself changed in ways that made it less religiously 
objectionable. Given these forces, the decline of the Mormon court 
system is less surprising than the fact that it continued to aggressively 
operate for decades after the coming of the railroad. 
An important part of this transition was the creation of a 
religiously sanctioned persona for Latter-day Saint lawyers. This not 
only facilitated the softening of Mormon attitudes toward recourse 
to secular courts but also provided a bridge that allowed Mormons 
to maintain continuity to the older tradition of the church judiciary. 
In 1856, Brigham Young referred to litigation as a Satanic froth that 
right-thinking Latter-day Saints should avoid.341 In 1872, however, 
he insisted that “[f]or a man to understand the law is very 
excellent.”342 He went on to explain the proper Mormon 
understanding of the law: “They that [understand the law],” he 
 
 341. Young, supra note 187, at 237. 
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insisted, “are peacemakers, they are legitimate lawyers.”343 This 
vision of law properly understood could continue even in the 
absence of church courts deciding civil cases. It also facilitated 
Mormon acceptance of the common law by providing continuity 
with the older tradition of church courts, even as these tribunals 
were abandoned as part of Mormonism’s accommodation with 
American Protestantism. 
Indeed, this vision of law properly understood continues to be 
echoed in modern Mormon sermons. For example, in 1986, former 
law professor and judge Dallin H. Oaks, then a Mormon Apostle, 
gave a sermon to the church’s semiannual general conference 
denouncing sharp dealing and frivolous litigation: 
We live in a world where many look on the marketplace as a 
ruthless arena where the buyer must beware, where no one is 
obligated to do more than the law requires, and where fraud isn’t 
fraud unless you can prove it in court.  
Members of the Church of Jesus Christ have a higher standard.344 
He went on to denounce “[s]cheming promoters with glib 
tongues and ingratiating manners [who] deceive their neighbors into 
investments . . . . Difficulties of proof make fraud a hard crime to 
enforce. But the inadequacies of the laws of man provide no license 
for transgressions under the laws of God.”345 Likewise, he 
condemned “[p]ersons who prosecute frivolous lawsuits.”346 In the 
same sermon, however, he praised an “idealistic young professional,” 
presumably an attorney, who denounced the illegal and unchristian 
treatment of migrant farm workers.347 The themes of supra-legal 
religious obligations, the denunciation of litigation, and the role of 
the religiously informed professional mark the afterlife of the ideals 
that both gave rise to the expansive jurisdiction of the Mormon 
courts in the nineteenth century and negotiated its eventual decline. 
Likewise, something of the First Presidency’s ambivalence in the 
1890s remains in the current procedures governing Mormon courts, 
which continue to operate albeit on a smaller scale. Today, the 
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justification for the Mormon judiciary is couched almost entirely in 
pastoral terms. According to modern guidelines promulgated by the 
church, ecclesiastical discipline exists to “facilitate repentance by 
helping transgressors recognize and forsake sin, seek forgiveness, 
make restitution, and demonstrate a renewed commitment to keep 
the commandments.”348 Consonant with Oaks’ sermon, however, 
the church refuses to concede its prerogative to inquire into 
misconduct related to civil litigation: “Disciplinary councils should 
not attempt to resolve disputes over property rights or other civil 
controversies. However, if such a dispute involves accusations that a 
member has committed acts that would justify Church discipline, the 
accusations should be treated like any other accusations of 
transgressions.”349 
In a similar vein, the modern rules state that “[n]ormally a 
disciplinary council is not held to consider conduct being examined 
by a criminal trial until the court has reached a final judgment” but 
clearly reserve the right to inquire into matters resolved in secular 
courts.350 Indeed, the rules even contemplate that church leaders 
might be asked by members to arbitrate disputes, but insist that in 
such a case “they should act as unofficial, private advisers and should 
not involve the Church.”351 In short, while the Mormon courts have 
abandoned the expansive jurisdiction that they once claimed, 
preaching continues to the court house, and judging continues apace 
within the Temple. 
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